Is shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing

Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):

Python shell/command execution
MCP server launches a host command
Python filesystem read

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).

repo

mcp_server · https://github.com/shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice

LOW

/ 100 risk score

Snapshot · scanned Oct 8, 2026 · repo@52afbed · engine 0.56.4 / ruleset 62

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):

filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectedshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface

Tool Usage

Execution authority

Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access

Filesystem reach

Tool Execution Context

Supply-chain provenance risk

General Protections / Supply Chain

Findings (6)

HIGHMCP server launches a host commandST-MCP-SERVER-EXEC

An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.

.mcp.json:4-4

"command": "npx",

.mcp.json:4-4

"command": "npx",

.mcp.json:4-4

"command": "npx",

Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.

Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.

HIGHPython shell/command executionST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

.claude/hooks/scripts/hooks.py:107-112

subprocess.run(
                    ["which", player[0]],
                    stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                    stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                    check=True
                )

.claude/hooks/scripts/hooks.py:188-193

subprocess.Popen(
                        audio_player + [str(file_path)],
                        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                        start_new_session=True …

.codex/hooks/scripts/hooks.py:83-88

subprocess.run(
                    ["which", player[0]],
                    stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                    stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                    check=True
                )

.codex/hooks/scripts/hooks.py:144-149

subprocess.Popen(
                        audio_player + [str(file_path)],
                        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                        start_new_session=True …

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

MEDIUMAgent or editor configuration runs a command automaticallyST-AGENT-AUTORUN

The component ships agent or IDE configuration that executes a command without a separate step: a Claude Code / Gemini CLI / Cursor hook, or a VS Code task that runs when the folder opens. Opening the project in that tool runs it with the developer's privileges. (25 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).

Is shanraisshan/claude-code-best-practice safe?

repo

Behavioral traits

Findings (6)

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Check your own component