Is ZhuLinsen/daily_stock_analysis safe?
- Python shell/command execution
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Defense-evasion command idiom
What to do: Read the findings below before installing: each one opens the exact line of code it was found on.
ZhuLinsen/daily_stock_analysis is a PyPI package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 2 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: delegated authentication, filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 30/100 (medium).
repo
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of ZhuLinsen/daily_stock_analysis's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (12)
A command uses a known defense-evasion idiom: PowerShell execution-policy bypass / encoded command / hidden window, macOS code-signing bypass, or launching a payload from a world-writable temp directory. These are hallmarks of droppers and rarely appear in legitimate code. (2 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
$probeProcess = Start-Process -FilePath $packagedEntry -Wait -PassThru -WindowStyle Hidden
Fix: Verify why the component bypasses execution policy / code signing or runs from a temp directory; these patterns are characteristic of malware staging.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
const { spawn } = require('child_process');backendProcess = spawn(backendPath, args, {backendProcess = spawn(pythonPath, pythonArgs, {spawn('taskkill', ['/PID', String(processToStop.pid), '/T', '/F'], { windowsHide: true }).on('error', () => {const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process')import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
result = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True)
return subprocess.check_output(["git", *args], cwd=ROOT, text=True, encoding="utf-8").strip()
result = subprocess.run(
["git", "ls-files", "--", ".claude"],
cwd=ROOT,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=True,
)return subprocess.call(
[sys.executable, "-m", "pytest", *selected, *pytest_args],
cwd=REPO_ROOT,
)version = subprocess.run(
[command[0], "--version"],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=10,
env=_controlled_environment(),
).stdout.strip()subprocess.run(command, cwd=REPO_ROOT, check=True, env=env)
result = subprocess.run(
["taskkill", "/T", "/F", "/PID", str(proc.pid)],
timeout=30,
)proc = subprocess.Popen(
child_args,
cwd=str(REPO_ROOT),
**_spawn_kwargs("nt"),
)proc = subprocess.Popen(
child_args,
cwd=str(REPO_ROOT),
**_spawn_kwargs("posix"),
)self.process = subprocess.Popen(
self.command,
cwd=str(safe_path),
env=self.environment,
stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=s …process = subprocess.Popen(
[executable, *command_argv],
stdin=stdin_handle,
stdout=stdout_handle,
stderr=stderr_handle, …result = subprocess.run(
[
playwright_command,
"screenshot",
"--browser",
"chromium",
"--viewport-size",
"1080,720", …result = subprocess.run(
[m2f_command, md_path, "png", f"outputDirectory={temp_dir}"],
capture_output=True,
timeout=60,
check=False,
)process = subprocess.Popen(
command,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE if capture_output else subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE if capture_output else subprocess.DEVNULL,
text=capture_output,
env=contro …completed = subprocess.run(
["ps", "-axo", "pid=,ppid="],
check=False,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=5,
)subprocess.run(
["taskkill", "/PID", str(process_id), "/T", "/F"],
check=False,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
timeout=10,
)subprocess.run(command, cwd=frontend_dir, check=True)
Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.
A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.
const PUBLIC_BIND_HOSTS = Object.freeze(new Set(['0.0.0.0', '::', '[::]', '*']));
return '0.0.0.0';
host: '0.0.0.0', // 允许公网访问
_PUBLIC_BIND_HOSTS = frozenset({"0.0.0.0", "::", "[::]", "*"})uvicorn server:app --reload --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
host="0.0.0.0",
if parsed.hostname in {"127.0.0.1", "localhost", "0.0.0.0"}:return parsed.hostname in {"127.0.0.1", "localhost", "0.0.0.0"}Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.
The component reads files from disk.
const manifestText = fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf-8');
content = fs.readFileSync(envFile, 'utf-8');
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.writeFileSync(resolveUpdateBackupManifestPath(), JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2), 'utf-8');
fs.rmSync(resolveUpdateBackupRoot(), { recursive: true, force: true });fs.rmSync(target, { recursive: true, force: true });fs.rmSync(target, { recursive: true, force: true });fs.appendFileSync(logFilePath, line, 'utf-8');
fs.writeFileSync(envPath, '# Configure your API keys and stock list here.\n', 'utf-8');
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component reads files from disk.
with open(event_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
text = CHANGELOG.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
html = index_html.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
if token_cache.read_bytes() == payload:
raw = token_cache.read_bytes()
data = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
content = COPILOT.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
content = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
gitignore = (ROOT / ".gitignore").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
html = index_html_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
payload = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
with open(csv_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8-sig') as f:
with open(csv_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8-sig') as f:
with open(csv_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8-sig') as f:
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8-sig") as f:
with open(output_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(output_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
workflow = yaml.safe_load(workflow_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
markdown = DOCS_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
markdown = DOCS_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(output_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
for line in env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore").splitlines():
with open(filepath, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
raw_text = filepath.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
_session_secret = secret_path.read_bytes()
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
with open(summary_file, 'a', encoding='utf-8') as f:
with open(summary_file, 'a', encoding='utf-8') as f:
with open('ai_review_result.txt', 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:with open(summary_file, 'a', encoding='utf-8') as f:
output.write_text(body, encoding="utf-8")
token_cache.write_bytes(payload)
Path(path).write_text(json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
sentinel_file.write_text(sentinel_token, encoding="utf-8")
workspace_file.write_text(workspace_token, encoding="utf-8")
shutil.rmtree(sentinel_dir, ignore_errors=True)
with open(doc_path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
with open(temp_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
DOCS_PATH.write_text(replace_managed_block(markdown, table), encoding="utf-8")
with open(output_path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
shutil.copyfile(WEB_INDEX_PATH, STATIC_INDEX_PATH)
shutil.rmtree(safe_path, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(self.safe_cwd, ignore_errors=True)
tmp_path.write_bytes(new_secret)
with open(secret_path, "xb") as f:
tmp_path.write_text(content)
tmp_path.write_text(content)
tmp_path.write_text(content)
handle = open(lock_path, "a+", encoding="utf-8")
filepath.write_text(content, encoding='utf-8')
prompt_path.write_text(prompt_text, encoding="utf-8")
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
activeRequest = http.get(url, (res) => {const response = await fetch(url, {import axios from 'axios';
return axios.isAxiosError(error);
import axios from 'axios';
const apiClient = axios.create({const response = await fetch(
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
The component makes outbound network requests.
import urllib.request
request = urllib.request.Request(f'{api_url}{path}', headers=headers)with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
import urllib.request
request = urllib.request.Request(
f"https://api.github.com/repos/{repo}/pulls/{pr_number}",
headers={
"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json",
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"User-Age …with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
import requests
resp = requests.post(
session_webhook,
json=payload,
timeout=10
)import requests
resp = requests.patch(
f"{base_url}/messages/@original",
json={"content": chunk},
timeout=10,
)resp = requests.post(
base_url,
json={"content": chunk},
timeout=10,
)import requests
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=10)
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=10)
import requests
resp = requests.get(_AV_BASE_URL, params=params, timeout=30)
resp = requests.get(_AV_BASE_URL, params={
'function': 'GLOBAL_QUOTE',
'symbol': symbol,
'apikey': self._api_key,
}, timeout=15)resp = requests.get(_AV_BASE_URL, params={
'function': 'SYMBOL_SEARCH',
'keywords': symbol,
'apikey': self._api_key,
}, timeout=10)import requests # 引入 requests 以捕获异常
response = requests.get(
"https://push2.eastmoney.com/api/qt/stock/get",
params={
"secid": secid,
"fltt": "2",
"fields": "f43,f44,f45,f46,f47,f48,f5 …import requests
resp = requests.get(url, params=params, timeout=15)
resp = requests.get(
f"{_FINNHUB_BASE_URL}/quote",
params={'symbol': symbol, 'token': self._api_key},
timeout=15,
)resp = requests.get(
f"{_FINNHUB_BASE_URL}/search",
params={'q': symbol, 'token': self._api_key},
timeout=10,
)import requests
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential.
"id_token",
Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
Provides ToolRegistry, @tool decorator, and wrapped tools
- @tool decorator for easy tool registration
# @tool decorator
@tool(name="get_realtime_quote", category="data",
# but omitted the explicit ``@tool(timeout_seconds=...)`` argument, fold
Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in ZhuLinsen/daily_stock_analysis.
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