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Is hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam safe?

What hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam does

Deep-Live-Cam is a Python desktop application for real-time face swap and video deepfakes from a single source image. It works on images, video files or a live webcam feed. It lives in hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam under AGPL-3.0, and the README names deeplivecam.net as the only official website. It reads your camera, can use a GPU, writes output files to disk, and downloads face models from Hugging Face, about 300 MB on first run. The README asks users to get consent before using a real person's face. Before installing, set it up in a venv, as the README recommends, and download models only from the hacksider/deep-live-cam Hugging Face repository it links.

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):
  • Python shell/command execution
  • Python filesystem write/delete
  • Python filesystem read

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam is a GitHub repository analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

Deep-Live-Cam

GitHub repository, read as a PyPI package · https://github.com/hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Nov 13, 2026 · Deep-Live-Cam@08896a5 · engine 1.1.0 / ruleset 100

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writenetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (4)

CapabilityPython shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

reader = subprocess.Popen(
            reader_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
        )
writer = subprocess.Popen(
            writer_cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
        )
subprocess.check_output(commands, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
output = subprocess.check_output(command, encoding="utf-8").strip().split("/")
output = subprocess.check_output(command).decode().strip()
output = subprocess.check_output(command).decode().strip()

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

CapabilityPython filesystem readnot scored · severity mediumST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file:
with open(partial, mode) as handle:
with open("switch_states.json", "r") as f:

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

CapabilityPython filesystem write/deletenot scored · severity mediumST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

shutil.copy2(modules.globals.target_path, modules.globals.output_path)
shutil.rmtree(temp_directory_path + f"/{i}")
with open("switch_states.json", "w") as f:
with open(staging_path, "wb") as f:
os.remove(staging_path)
os.remove(output_path)
shutil.move(temp_output_path, output_path)
shutil.rmtree(temp_directory_path)
with open(download_file_path, "wb") as f:

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

CapabilityPython network egressnot scored · severity mediumST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

request = urllib.request.Request(url, headers=headers)
response = urllib.request.urlopen(request, context=_ssl_context(), timeout=60)
import requests
response = requests.get(
                "https://thispersondoesnotexist.com/random-person.jpeg",
                headers={"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0"},
                timeout=10,
            )
request = urllib.request.Request(url)
response = urllib.request.urlopen(request, context=_ssl_context())

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam.

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