SkillTotal

Is affaan-m/ECC safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python shell/command execution
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Node.js dynamic code execution

ecc-universal is an AI mcp_server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 11 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

ecc-universal 2.2.0

mcp_server · https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Aug 16, 2026 · ecc-universal@2.2.0 · engine 0.38.1 / ruleset 42

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of affaan-m/ECC's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
dynamic code executionfilesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (11)

HIGHNode.js dynamic code executionST-DYN-NODE

The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).

{ pattern: /\beval\s*\(/g, name: "eval() usage - potential code injection" },

Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.

Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.

HIGHMCP server launches a host commandST-MCP-SERVER-EXEC

An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.

Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.

Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
import { execFileSync } from "child_process"
import { execFile } from "node:child_process"
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
const result = spawnSync(executable, argv, {
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [path.join(repoRoot, testFile)], {
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
const result = spawnSync(command, args, {
const { execFileSync } = require("node:child_process")
while ((match = indicatorPattern.exec(lowerText)) !== null) {
while ((match = pattern.exec(content)) !== null) {
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
// and Node's spawn() cannot resolve those wrappers via PATH without shell: true.
const result = spawnSync('claude', args, {
while ((match = regex.exec(safe)) !== null) {
const match = TOML_HEADER_RE.exec(raw);
const match = headerPattern.exec(raw);
const match = inlinePattern.exec(lines[index]);
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
const child = spawn('open', [url], {
try { const { spawn } = require('child_process'); const p = process.platform; const c = p === 'darwin' ? 'open' : p === 'win32' ? 'start' : 'xdg-open'; if (c === 'start') spawn('cmd', ['/c', 'start', dashboardUrl], { stdio: 'ignore' }); els …
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
const result = spawnSync(

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

HIGHPython shell/command executionST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

subprocess.Popen(argv, **kwargs)  # noqa: S603 - list argv, no shell=True, path validated above
result = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
result = subprocess.run(
            ["git", "-C", project_root, "worktree", "list", "--porcelain"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5
        )
result = subprocess.run(
            ["git", "-C", project_root, "remote", "get-url", "origin"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5
        )
result = subprocess.run(
        ["claude", "-p", prompt, "--model", model, "--output-format", "text"],
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
        timeout=60,
    )
result = subprocess.run(
        [
            "claude", "-p", scenario.prompt,
            "--model", model,
            "--max-turns", str(max_turns),
            "--add-dir", str(sandbox_dir),
            "--allowedTools", "Read,Write,Ed …
subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=sandbox_dir, capture_output=True)
subprocess.run(parts, cwd=sandbox_dir, capture_output=True)
result = subprocess.run(
        ["claude", "-p", prompt, "--model", model, "--output-format", "text"],
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
        timeout=120,
    )
result = subprocess.run(
            ["claude", "-p", prompt, "--model", model, "--output-format", "text"],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
            timeout=120,
        )

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
const content = fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8');
const packageJson = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packageJsonPath, "utf-8"))
const content = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(fullPath, "utf-8"))
const packageJson = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packageJsonPath, "utf-8"))
const content = fs.readFileSync(pyprojectPath, "utf-8")
const packageJson = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packageJsonPath, "utf-8"))
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8")
text = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ECC_ROOT, "rules", "common", file), "utf8").trim()
const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8")) as { packages?: unknown }
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(ECC_ROOT, "package.json"), "utf8")) as {
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packageJsonPath, 'utf8'));
const payload = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(0, 'utf8'));
pkgName = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packageJsonPath, 'utf8')).name;
return fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
text = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
const content = fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, relativePath), 'utf8');
current = fs.readFileSync(outputPath, 'utf8');
return fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(filePath)).digest('hex');
content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(HOOKS_FILE, 'utf-8'));
const schema = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(HOOKS_SCHEMA_PATH, 'utf-8'));
return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8'));

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem write/deleteST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, content, 'utf8');
fs.rmSync(codebuddyFullPath, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.unlinkSync(fullPath);
fs.rmSync(distDir, { recursive: true, force: true })
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, content, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, sanitized, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(outputPath, formatRegistry(registry), 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(absolutePath, `${JSON.stringify(report, null, 2)}\n`);
fs.appendFileSync(filePath, entry, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, compactedHeader + compactedTurns, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(out, history, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(out, JSON.stringify({ session: sessionName, turns }, null, 2), 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(out, txt, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(target, content, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(sessionPath, '', 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(indexPath, indexContent, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(outPath, content, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(configPath, nextRaw, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(configPath, cleaned + (toAppend.length > 0 ? appendText : ''), 'utf8');
fs.appendFileSync(configPath, appendText, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(writePath, output, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, adapted.text);
fs.writeFileSync(tty, `\x1b]9;${message}\x07`);
fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(state), 'utf8');
try { fs.unlinkSync(tmp); } catch { /* ignore */ }

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMPython filesystem readST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

with open(agent_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
with open(skill_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
with open(os.path.join(commands_dir, item), 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
with open(REGISTRY_FILE, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(REGISTRY_FILE, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(observations_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
instincts = parse_instinct_file(file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
lines = from_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
content = source_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
content = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython filesystem write/deleteST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

with open(AUDIT_FILE, "a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(tmp_file, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(tmp_file, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(into_file, "a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
output_file.write_text(output_content, encoding="utf-8")
out_path.write_text(output, encoding="utf-8")
output_file.write_text(output_content, encoding="utf-8")
output_file.write_text(output_content, encoding="utf-8")
(skill_dir / "SKILL.md").write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
cmd_file.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
agent_file.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

const res = await fetch('https://api.github.com/repos/affaan-m/ECC/releases/latest', {
const gw = await fetch(`${API}/gateway/bot`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bot ${TOKEN}` } }).then(r => r.json());
const res = await fetch(`https://discord.com/api/v10/applications/${APP_ID}/guilds/${GUILD}/commands`, {
const response = await fetch(url, options);
fetch('/api/proximity').then(function (r) { return r.json(); }).then(function (data) {
const response = await fetch('/api/actions/' + encodeURIComponent(actionId), {
const response = await fetch(url);
const response = await fetch('/api/work-items/' + pathSuffix, {
const request = https.get(parsed, { headers: options.accept ? { Accept: options.accept } : {} }, response => {
const res = await fetch('/api/session/' + key + '/feedback', {
try { await fetch('/api/session/' + key + '/end', { method: 'POST' }); } catch { /* server gone */ }
const req = http.request(
const req = http.request(
/\b(auth|login|password|passwd|token|secret|credential|api[_-]?key|session|jwt|oauth|cookie|sql|query|exec|eval|crypto|cipher|hash|hmac|sign|fs\.|readFile|writeFile|fetch|axios|request|subprocess|os\.system)\b/i;

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

MEDIUMPython network egressST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "aura-adapter/1.0"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:  # noqa: S310 (https only)
url = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/check?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"did": did})
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "ECC-instinct-import/2"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as response:
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as response:

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

Check your own component

Run the same evidence-backed scan on any MCP server, agent skill, or package.

Scan your own component

How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →