Is thedaviddias/Front-End-Checklist safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- npm install-time lifecycle hook
- Node.js dynamic code execution
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
thedaviddias/Front-End-Checklist is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).
front-end-checklist 1.0.0
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of thedaviddias/Front-End-Checklist's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (10)
The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).
<script>eval(location.hash.slice(1)); document.write('<p>hi</p>')</script>prompt: "Is this script OK to ship?\ndocument.write('<p>hi</p>'); eval(userInput)",{ pattern: /eval\s*\(/, message: 'Avoid using eval()', severity: 'critical' as const },return eval(userInput)
Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.
Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.
package.json runs scripts automatically when the package is installed.
"postinstall": "prisma generate",
Why it matters: Install scripts are a favorite supply-chain foothold — they execute on every machine that installs the package.
Fix: Inspect the hook command. Install-time scripts are a common supply chain execution vector; ensure they do nothing beyond a documented build step.
An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.
"command": "npx",
"command": "npx",
Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.
Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'const suite = spawn(
import type { ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process'import { type ChildProcess, spawn } from 'node:child_process'const child = spawn(process.execPath, args, {import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'const r = spawnSync(command, cmdArgs, {import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'const result = spawnSync('lefthook', ['install'], { stdio: 'inherit' })const { execSync } = require('node:child_process')const result = execSync('git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACM', {Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.
['0.0.0.0', 8],
['::', 127],
Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.
The component reads files from disk.
const inputFile = fs.readFileSync(INPUT_PATH, 'utf-8')
const outputFile = fs.readFileSync(OUTPUT_PATH, 'utf-8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8')
const configContent = fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8')
const packageJson = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packageJsonPath, 'utf8'))
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
const code = fs.existsSync(candidatePath) ? fs.readFileSync(candidatePath, 'utf8') : ''
return fs.existsSync(filePath) ? fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8') : ''
const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8')
const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8').replace(/\0/g, '')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.writeFileSync(OUTPUT_PATH, `${JSON.stringify(output, null, 2)}\n`)fs.rmSync(path.resolve(packageRoot, 'rules'), { recursive: true, force: true })fs.writeFileSync(filePath, content)
fs.rmSync(tempRoot, { recursive: true, force: true })fs.writeFileSync(doc.filePath, matter.stringify(doc.content, nextFrontmatter))
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, nextRaw)
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).
"prepare": "node scripts/setup/install-lefthook.mjs",
Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.
Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const response = await fetch('/api/profile/github-sync', { method: 'POST' })const res = await fetch('/api/profile')const res = await fetch('/api/account/export')const res = await fetch('/api/account', { method: 'DELETE' })const response = await fetch('/api/audits')const response = await fetch('/api/subscribe/me', { method: 'POST' })const response = await fetch('/api/profile')const res = await fetch('/api/waitlist', {const res = await fetch('/api/waitlist', {fetch(`${NPM_REGISTRY}/${encoded}/latest`, {fetch(`${NPM_DOWNLOADS_API}/${encoded}`, {const res = await fetch('/api/progress')fetch('/api/progress', {const res = await fetch('/api/progress', {const res = await fetch('/api/progress', {const response = await fetch(`/api/rules/${ruleId}/feedback`)const response = await fetch(`/api/rules/${ruleId}/feedback`, {const res = await fetch('/api/checklists')const response = await fetch(GITHUB_REPO_API_URL, {const response = await fetch(GITHUB_GRAPHQL_URL, {const response = await fetch(GITHUB_REPO_API_URL, {const response = await fetch(OC_GRAPHQL_URL, {const accountResponse = await fetch(OC_GRAPHQL_URL, {const response = await fetch('https://api.github.com/user', {const response = await fetch('https://api.github.com/user', {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
"mcpServers": {"mcpServers": {"mcpServers": {server.registerTool(
const server = new McpServer(MCP_SERVER_INFO, {Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in thedaviddias/Front-End-Checklist.
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