Is calesthio/OpenMontage safe?
- Python shell/command execution
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js dynamic code execution
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
calesthio/OpenMontage is a PyPI package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
repo
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of calesthio/OpenMontage's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (8)
The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).
Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.
Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";const installResult = spawnSync(
const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, args, {import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";const installResult = spawnSync(
const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, args, {import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";return spawnSync("python3", ["-c", probe], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0;return spawnSync("pip", ["install", "-q", ...deps], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0;const proc = spawn(
const proc = spawn("python3", ["-c", script], { detached: true, stdio: ["ignore", fd, fd] });import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";const r = spawnSync("python3", ["-c", "import elevenlabs"], { stdio: "ignore" });const r = spawnSync(
const p = spawn(cmd, args, { stdio: "ignore", ...opts });const ff = spawnSync(
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";const ff = spawnSync(
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True)
subprocess.run(["manimgl", __file__, "ThreeDSceneTemplate"])
subprocess.run(["manimgl", __file__, "BasicSceneTemplate"])
subprocess.run(["manimgl", __file__, "MathSceneTemplate"])
subprocess.run(
["ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", path, "-ac", "1", "-ar", str(SR), wav],
capture_output=True, check=True,
)return subprocess.run(
cmd, capture_output=capture, text=True, check=check,
)subprocess.check_call(
[sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--quiet", "openai-whisper"]
)subprocess.run(["manimgl", __file__, "ThreeDSceneTemplate"])
subprocess.run(["manimgl", __file__, "BasicSceneTemplate"])
subprocess.run(["manimgl", __file__, "MathSceneTemplate"])
return subprocess.run(
cmd, capture_output=capture, text=True, check=check,
)subprocess.check_call(
[sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--quiet", "openai-whisper"]
)subprocess.Popen(cmd, **kwargs)
result = subprocess.run(
["ffmpeg", "-y", "-loglevel", "error", "-ss", "1.5",
"-i", str(source), "-frames:v", "1",
"-vf", f"scale={width}:-2", str(tmp)],
capture_output=True, …proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
subprocess.run([npm_cmd, "install"], cwd=COMPOSER_DIR, check=True)
subprocess.run(
[
npx_cmd,
"remotion",
"render",
"src/index.tsx",
"Explainer",
str(output_path),
"--props",
str(props_path), …subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=COMPOSER_DIR, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600)
subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-y", "-loglevel", "error", "-loop", "1",
"-i", str(first_frame), "-t", "4", "-vf", "scale=960:540",
"-pix_fmt", "yuv420p", str(renders / "final.mp4")],
ch …server = subprocess.Popen(
[sys.executable, "-m", "backlot", "serve", "--port", str(PORT)],
env=env, cwd=REPO_ROOT,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)subprocess.run(
["npx", "playwright", "screenshot",
"--viewport-size", f"{w},{h}",
"--wait-for-timeout", str(wait_ms),
f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}{path}", str(out)], …subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "scripts/backlot_screenshot_stage.py", "--stage-only"],
cwd=REPO_ROOT,
check=True,
timeout=180,
)server = subprocess.Popen(
[sys.executable, "-m", "backlot", "serve", "--port", str(PORT)],
cwd=REPO_ROOT,
env=env,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)subprocess.run(
[
"npx",
"playwright",
"screenshot",
"--viewport-size",
f"{width},{height}",
"--wait-for-timeout",
str(wait_ms),
url, …Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.
The component reads files from disk.
src = path.read_text()
with open(os.path.join(tmp_dir, json_files[0]), "r") as f:
with open(os.path.join(tmp_dir, json_files[0]), "r") as f:
html = (UI_DIR / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
with open(CHECKPOINT_SCHEMA_PATH, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(marker_path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(marker_path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(checkpoints[0], encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(config_path) as f:
with open(self.index_path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
with open(SCHEMA_PATH, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(PLAYBOOK_SCHEMA_PATH) as f:
with open(path) as f:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
previous = json.loads(manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
manifest = json.loads(manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
with open(SCHEMA_PATH, encoding="utf-8") as f:
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
with open(output_path, "wb") as f:
with open(args.output, "w") as f:
Path(a.out).write_text(json.dumps(d, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
shutil.rmtree(tmp_dir, ignore_errors=True)
os.remove(tmp_wav)
with open(args.output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(output_path, "wb") as f:
shutil.rmtree(tmp_dir, ignore_errors=True)
os.remove(tmp_wav)
with open(args.output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(marker_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
shutil.copyfile(path, target)
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(tmp_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(tmp_index, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, "w") as f:
manifest_path.write_text(json.dumps(manifest, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
(art_dir / "decision_log.json").write_text(json.dumps(decision_log(pid), indent=2))
(art_dir / "script.json").write_text(json.dumps(script, indent=2))
(art_dir / "scene_plan.json").write_text(json.dumps(plan, indent=2))
(art_dir / "asset_manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps(manifest, indent=2))
(art_dir / "edit_decisions.json").write_text(json.dumps(edit, indent=2))
shutil.rmtree(STAGE_DIR)
shutil.rmtree(pdir)
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const response = await fetch(url);
const response = await fetch(url, {const res = await fetch(`${HEYGEN_BASE}${path}`, opts);const res = await fetch(url);
const res = await fetch(inner.audio_url);
const res = await fetch(url);
fetch("https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/world-atlas@2.0.2/countries-110m.json").then(function(r){return r.json();}).then(function(w){const res = await fetch(
const response = await fetch(url);
const response = await fetch(url, {const res = await fetch(url);
const r = await fetch(url); if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`fetch failed ${r.status}: ${url}`);Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
The component makes outbound network requests.
response = requests.get(url, timeout=60)
response = requests.request(
method,
url,
headers=self.headers,
timeout=30,
**kwargs,
)response = requests.get(url, timeout=60)
response = requests.request(
method,
url,
headers=self.headers,
timeout=30,
**kwargs,
)import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/health", timeout=1.5) as resp:import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/api/health", timeout=1):import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/api/health", timeout=1):import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}{path}", timeout=10) as response:import requests
resp = requests.get(f"{self.server_url}/system_stats", timeout=5)resp = requests.get(
f"{self.server_url}/object_info/{node_class}", timeout=10
)response = requests.get(
f"{self.server_url}/object_info/{node_class}", timeout=10
)resp = requests.post(
f"{self.server_url}/prompt",
json={"prompt": workflow, "client_id": self.client_id},
timeout=30,
)resp = requests.get(f"{self.server_url}/history/{prompt_id}", timeout=10)resp = requests.get(
f"{self.server_url}/view",
params={
"filename": filename,
"subfolder": subfolder,
"type": folder_type,
},
timeout=120, …resp = requests.post(
f"{self.server_url}/upload/image",
files={"image": (name, f, "image/png")},
timeout=30,
)import requests
self.session = session or requests.Session()
import requests
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in calesthio/OpenMontage.
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