SkillTotal

Is rtk-ai/rtk safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python shell/command execution
  • Node.js shell/command execution

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

rtk-ai/rtk is an AI component analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

repo

ai_component · https://github.com/rtk-ai/rtk
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Oct 8, 2026 · repo@e4f0509 · engine 0.56.4 / ruleset 62

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of rtk-ai/rtk's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
shell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access

Findings (2)

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

HIGHPython shell/command executionST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

result = subprocess.run(
                ["rtk", "rewrite", command],
                shell=False,
                timeout=2,
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,
            )
subprocess.run(
            ["tar", "czf", tarball, "-C", str(source_dir), "."],
            check=True,
        )

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in rtk-ai/rtk.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →