SkillTotal

Is Adeu MCP server safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python shell/command execution
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Python filesystem read

adeu is an AI python_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 6 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

adeu 2.4.0

python_package · pypi:adeu
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Aug 14, 2026 · adeu@2.4.0 · engine 0.38.1 / ruleset 42

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Adeu MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (6)

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

`)}var S=class{options;rules;lexer;constructor(e){this.options=e||w}space(e){let t=this.rules.block.newline.exec(e);if(t&&t[0].length>0)return{type:"space",raw:t[0]}}code(e){let t=this.rules.block.code.exec(e);if(t){let n=t[0].replace(this. …
`)}}}fences(e){let t=this.rules.block.fences.exec(e);if(t){let n=t[0],s=rt(n,t[3]||"",this.rules);return{type:"code",raw:n,lang:t[2]?t[2].trim().replace(this.rules.inline.anyPunctuation,"$1"):t[2],text:s}}}heading(e){let t=this.rules.block. …
`)}}blockquote(e){let t=this.rules.block.blockquote.exec(e);if(t){let n=A(t[0],`
`);continue}}return{type:"blockquote",raw:s,tokens:r,text:i}}}list(e){let t=this.rules.block.list.exec(e);if(t){let n=t[1].trim(),s=n.length>1,i={type:"list",raw:"",ordered:s,start:s?+n.slice(0,-1):"",loose:!1,items:[]};n=s?`\\d{1,9}\\${n.s …
`,e=e.substring(G.length+1),d=C.slice(f)}}i.loose||(o?i.loose=!0:this.rules.other.doubleBlankLine.test(p)&&(o=!0));let y=null,ee;this.options.gfm&&(y=this.rules.other.listIsTask.exec(u),y&&(ee=y[0]!=="[ ] ",u=u.replace(this.rules.other.list …
`):[],r={type:"table",raw:t[0],header:[],align:[],rows:[]};if(n.length===s.length){for(let o of s)this.rules.other.tableAlignRight.test(o)?r.align.push("right"):this.rules.other.tableAlignCenter.test(o)?r.align.push("center"):this.rules.oth …
`?t[1].slice(0,-1):t[1];return{type:"paragraph",raw:t[0],text:n,tokens:this.lexer.inline(n)}}}text(e){let t=this.rules.block.text.exec(e);if(t)return{type:"text",raw:t[0],text:t[0],tokens:this.lexer.inline(t[0])}}escape(e){let t=this.rules. …
`+s.text,this.inlineQueue.pop(),this.inlineQueue.at(-1).src=r.text):t.push(s);continue}if(e){let r="Infinite loop on byte: "+e.charCodeAt(0);if(this.options.silent){console.error(r);break}else throw new Error(r)}}return this.state.top=!0,t} …

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

HIGHPython shell/command executionST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

proc = subprocess.Popen(
        ["uv", "run", "adeu-server"],
        stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,  # Ignore server logs
        text=True,
    )
git_sha = subprocess.check_output(
                ["git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"],
                cwd=str(Path(__file__).parent),
                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                text=True,
            ).strip()
build_ts_raw = subprocess.check_output(
                ["git", "log", "-1", "--format=%ct"],
                cwd=str(Path(__file__).parent),
                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                text=True,
            ).strip()
subprocess.run(["open", str(p)], check=True)
subprocess.run(["xdg-open", str(p)], check=True)

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

MEDIUMPython filesystem readST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

with open(test_json_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(input_docx_path, "rb") as f:
for ln in manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
b = (base / "MANIFEST.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
n = (new / "MANIFEST.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
bt = (base / k).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
nt = (new / k).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(input_path, "rb") as f:
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(config_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
and 'name = "adeu"' in (cwd / "pyproject.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
current_content = config_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
raw = path.read_bytes()
with open(path, "rb") as _fh:
with open(path, "rb") as f:
with open(path, "rb") as f:
diff_warnings.extend(collect_media_difference_warnings(args.original.read_bytes(), args.modified.read_bytes()))
text_data = cache_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
existing_raw = cache_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(asset_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython filesystem write/deleteST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

(test_dir / "golden_raw.md").write_text(raw_md, encoding="utf-8")
(test_dir / "golden_clean.md").write_text(clean_md, encoding="utf-8")
(test_dir / "golden_abstract.xml").write_text(abstract_xml, encoding="utf-8")
(test_dir / "golden_raw.md").write_text(raw_md.replace("\r\n", "\n"), encoding="utf-8")
(test_dir / "golden_clean.md").write_text(clean_md.replace("\r\n", "\n"), encoding="utf-8")
(outdir / f"{name}.{view}.txt").write_text(text, encoding="utf-8", newline="")
(outdir / "MANIFEST.txt").write_text("\n".join(manifest) + "\n", encoding="utf-8", newline="")
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(output_path, "wb") as f:
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
shutil.copy2(config_path, backup_path)
with open(config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
tmp_file.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
with open(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMPython network egressST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

req = urllib.request.Request(
        url,
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}",
            "Accept": "application/json",
        },
        method="GET",
    )
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as response:

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

Check your own component

Run the same evidence-backed scan on any MCP server, agent skill, or package.

Scan your own component

How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →