Is AniList MCP server safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing

Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):

Dangerous MCP tool capability
MCP server launches a host command
npm prepare hook

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

AniList MCP server is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: install time execution and mcp tools detected — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

anilist-mcp 1.4.0

GitHub repository, read as an npm package · https://github.com/yuna0x0/anilist-mcp

LOW

/ 100 risk score

Snapshot · scanned Nov 13, 2026 · anilist-mcp@1.4.0 · engine 1.1.0 / ruleset 100

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of AniList MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):

install time executionmcp tools detected

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface

Tool Usage

Execution authority

Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access

Supply-chain provenance risk

General Protections / Supply Chain

Findings (4)

CapabilityDangerous MCP tool capabilitynot scored · severity highST-MCP-DANGEROUS-TOOL

An MCP tool exposes a powerful capability (files, shell, network, browser, or credentials).

manifest.json:54

"name": "get_user_activity",

Why it matters: Wired into an agent, these grant it real access to your machine — confirm each is required.

Fix: Confirm each powerful tool is required and constrained; broad MCP tools (shell/filesystem/network) grant an agent significant host access.

CapabilityMCP server launches a host commandnot scored · severity highST-MCP-SERVER-EXEC

An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.

manifest.json:14

"type": "node",

Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.

Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.

Capabilitynpm prepare hooknot scored · severity mediumST-INSTALL-NPM-PREPARE

package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).

package.json:23

"prepare": "pnpm run build",

Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.

Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.

CapabilityMCP tool surface detectednot scored · severity lowST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

manifest.json:24

"tools": [

server.json:1

manifest.json:14

"type": "node",

index.ts:52

const server = new McpServer({

index.ts:78

const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({

index.ts:155

const stdioTransport = new StdioServerTransport();

tools/activity.ts:13-14

server.tool(
    "delete_activity",

tools/activity.ts:54-55

server.tool(
    "get_activity",

tools/activity.ts:86-87

server.tool(
    "get_user_activity",

tools/activity.ts:132-133

server.tool(
    "post_message_activity",

tools/activity.ts:188-189

server.tool(
    "post_text_activity",

tools/lists.ts:14-15

server.tool(
    "add_list_entry",

tools/lists.ts:54-55

server.tool(
    "get_user_anime_list",

tools/lists.ts:86-87

server.tool(
    "get_user_manga_list",

tools/lists.ts:118-119

server.tool(
    "remove_list_entry",

tools/lists.ts:159-160

server.tool(
    "update_list_entry",

tools/media.ts:14-15

server.tool(
    "get_anime",

tools/media.ts:67-68

server.tool(
    "favourite_anime",

tools/media.ts:110-111

server.tool(
    "favourite_manga",

tools/media.ts:153-154

server.tool(
    "get_manga",

tools/misc.ts:13-14

server.tool(
    "favourite_studio",

tools/misc.ts:56-57

server.tool(
    "get_genres",

tools/misc.ts:86-87

server.tool(
    "get_media_tags",

tools/misc.ts:116-117

server.tool(
    "get_site_statistics",

tools/misc.ts:146-147

server.tool(
    "get_studio",

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in AniList MCP server.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →