SkillTotal

Is Apify MCP server safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Possible command injection (exec with dynamic command)
  • MCP server launches a host command

@apify/actors-mcp-server is an AI mcp_server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 7 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 20/100 (low).

@apify/actors-mcp-server 0.14.3

mcp_server · https://github.com/apify/apify-mcp-server
LOW
20
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Aug 9, 2026 · @apify/actors-mcp-server@0.14.3 · engine 0.38.1 / ruleset 42

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Apify MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (7)

HIGHPossible command injection (exec with dynamic command)ST-CMDI-NODE

The code builds an OS command out of values that can change at runtime, then runs it through a shell.

const versionString = execSync(`pnpm view ${PACKAGE_NAME} versions --json`, { encoding: 'utf8' });

Why it matters: If any of those values come from untrusted input, an attacker can run their own commands on the machine.

Fix: Use execFile/spawn with an argument array instead of exec; never build a shell command string from external input.

HIGHMCP server launches a host commandST-MCP-SERVER-EXEC

An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.

"command": "node",
"command": "node",

Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.

Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
const versionString = execSync(`pnpm view ${PACKAGE_NAME} versions --json`, { encoding: 'utf8' });
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
const child = spawn(cmd, args, {
const match = KV_RECORD_PATH_RE.exec(pathname);
const match = /;\s*charset\s*=\s*"?([^";]+)"?/i.exec(contentType ?? '');

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

const cssContent = await fs.readFile(args.path, 'utf8');

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem write/deleteST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

await fs.rm(distPath, { recursive: true, force: true });

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

* caps every body here — its download is also aborted mid-flight at this limit via axios `maxContentLength`.
const response = await handler.fetch(request, options);
async fetch(input: Request | URL | string, init?: RequestInit) {
return fetch(input, { ...init, headers });
const response = await fetch(url, {
import { isAxiosError } from 'axios';
* (`user@api.apify.com`) are rejected even when the host is genuinely ours: axios drops
/** The mid-consumption abort axios raises when a streamed body crosses `maxContentLength`. */
* The request goes straight through `apifyClient.httpClient.axios` (the same axios instance
* socket. One attempt, no retries. `maxContentLength` is enforced by axios itself mid-consumption
* (verified in axios@1.16.1: the adapter wraps streamed responses in a byte-counting generator
// The raw axios instance skips `httpClient.call()` → `ensureNodeInit()`, so reads do NOT honor
response = await apifyClient.httpClient.axios.request<unknown>({
// `validateStatus: null` on this axios instance resolves non-2xx responses instead of throwing,
// instead of blocking on the HTTP fetch (the SDK does not accept an AbortSignal directly).
* The axios response interceptor stores the header value here so it can be
return (apifyClient as unknown as { httpClient?: { axios?: AxiosInstanceLike } }).httpClient?.axios;
* Registers an axios response error interceptor on the ApifyClient's internal
* on errors, so we reach into the internal axios instance.
log.warning('[x402] Failed to access apify-client axios internals — payment header capture disabled');
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/promise-function-async -- axios interceptors must return a rejected promise, not throw
* 1. The captured `payment-required` response header (via axios interceptor)

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

"mcpServers": {
this.server = new Server(getServerInfo(), {
this.server = new Server(getServerInfo(), {

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

Check your own component

Run the same evidence-backed scan on any MCP server, agent skill, or package.

Scan your own component

How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →