Is Auth0 MCP Server safe?
What Auth0 MCP Server does
The Auth0 MCP Server gives AI assistants access to the Auth0 Management API in natural language, for tasks such as listing applications and APIs or creating and deploying actions. It is published on npm under the @auth0 scope and described there as a beta. It signs in through the OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow and stores credentials in the system keychain. Before installing, limit it to read tools with --read-only or a --tools pattern such as auth0_list_*,auth0_get_*, because the --tools default is * and enables every tool.
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
- Node.js network egress
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
Auth0 MCP Server is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: delegated authentication, filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
@auth0/
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Auth0 MCP Server's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (5)
The component reads files from disk.
const data = fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8');
const data = fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8');
existingContent = fs.readFileSync(resolvedPath, 'utf-8');
const content = fs.readFileSync(gitignorePath, 'utf-8');
return dotenvParse(fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8'));
const state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(statePath, 'utf-8'));
lines = fs.readFileSync(logPath, 'utf-8').split('\n').filter(Boolean);Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.writeFileSync(configPath, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2));
fs.writeFileSync(configPath, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2));
fs.writeFileSync(tmpFile, content, { encoding: 'utf-8', mode: CREDENTIAL_FILE_MODE });fs.unlinkSync(tmpFile);
fs.appendFileSync(gitignorePath, `${header}\n${envFileName}\n`, 'utf-8');fs.writeFileSync(gitignorePath, `# Auth0 credentials\n${envFileName}\n`, 'utf-8');fs.writeFileSync(statePath, JSON.stringify(state, null, 2), 'utf-8');
fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, content, 'utf-8');
fs.unlinkSync(tmpPath);
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const response = await fetch(`https://${config.tenant}/oauth/device/code`, {const response = await fetch(`https://${config.tenant}/oauth/token`, {const response = await fetch(`https://${config.tenant}/oauth/token`, {const response = await fetch(`https://${config.tenant}/oauth/revoke`, {const response = await fetch(this.endpoint, {const response = await fetch(url, {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential.
grant_type: 'refresh_token',
Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
const server = new Server({ name: 'auth0', version: packageVersion }, { capabilities: { tools: {}, logging: {} } });server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => {server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
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