Is Azure MCP Server safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Possible command injection (exec with dynamic command)
- npm install-time lifecycle hook
@azure/mcp is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 3 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: install time execution and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 20/100 (low).
@azure/mcp 3.0.0-beta.33
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Azure MCP Server's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (3)
The code builds an OS command out of values that can change at runtime, then runs it through a shell.
execSync(`npm install ${platformPackageName}@${packageVersion}`, {execSync(`npm install ${platformPackageName}@${packageVersion} --no-save --prefer-online`, {Why it matters: If any of those values come from untrusted input, an attacker can run their own commands on the machine.
Fix: Use execFile/spawn with an argument array instead of exec; never build a shell command string from external input.
package.json runs scripts automatically when the package is installed.
"postinstall": "node ./scripts/post-install-script.js"
Why it matters: Install scripts are a favorite supply-chain foothold — they execute on every machine that installs the package.
Fix: Inspect the hook command. Install-time scripts are a common supply chain execution vector; ensure they do nothing beyond a documented build step.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
const { execSync } = require('child_process')execSync(`npm install ${platformPackageName}@${packageVersion}`, {execSync(`npm install ${platformPackageName}@${packageVersion} --no-save --prefer-online`, {Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
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Scan your own componentHow we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →