Is Cloudflare MCP server safe?
What Cloudflare MCP server does
This repository contains several MCP servers that connect an MCP client to a Cloudflare account, covering documentation, Workers bindings and builds, observability, containers, Browser Run, Logpush and more, each at its own mcp.cloudflare.com endpoint. It is published in the cloudflare/mcp-server-cloudflare repository. Per the README, the servers can read account configuration, make suggestions and apply those changes for you. Before installing, connect only the specific servers you need, and when you use an API token, grant only the permissions that particular server requires, as the README describes for the Browser Run server.
- Dangerous MCP tool capability
- Node.js network egress
- Delegated authentication (OAuth 2.0 / OIDC)
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
Cloudflare MCP server is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: delegated authentication, mcp tools detected and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
@cloudflare/
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Cloudflare MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (4)
An MCP tool exposes a powerful capability (files, shell, network, browser, or credentials).
context.registerTool( 'get_leaked_credentials_data',
context.registerTool( 'container_file_write',
context.registerTool( 'container_file_read',
Why it matters: Wired into an agent, these grant it real access to your machine — confirm each is required.
Fix: Confirm each powerful tool is required and constrained; broad MCP tools (shell/filesystem/network) grant an agent significant host access.
The component makes outbound network requests.
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
declare function fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
fetch(request: Request): Response | Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
declare function fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
fetch(request: Request): Response | Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
declare function fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
fetch(request: Request): Response | Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
declare function fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
fetch(request: Request): Response | Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
declare function fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit<RequestInitCfProperties>): Promise<Response>;
fetch(request: Request): Response | Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
fetch(input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (5 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
grant_type: 'authorization_code',
grant_type: 'refresh_token',
app.get(`/oauth/authorize`, async (c) => {app.post(`/oauth/authorize`, async (c) => {authorizeEndpoint: '/oauth/authorize',
Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
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Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Cloudflare MCP server.
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Scan your own componentHow we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →