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SkillTotal

Is Docfork MCP server safe?

Low risk - review the findings before installing
Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):
  • Possible command injection (exec with dynamic command)
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • npm install-time lifecycle hook

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

Docfork MCP server is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: install time execution, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 20/100 (low).

docfork 2.1.0

GitHub repository, read as an npm package · https://github.com/docfork/docfork-mcp
LOW
20
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Nov 13, 2026 · docfork@2.1.0 · engine 1.1.0 / ruleset 100

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Docfork MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
install time executionmcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication
Supply-chain provenance risk
General Protections / Supply Chain

Findings (6)

HIGHPossible command injection (exec with dynamic command)ST-CMDI-NODE

The code builds an OS command out of values that can change at runtime, then runs it through a shell.

exec(`${cmd} "${url}"`, () => {

Why it matters: If any of those values come from untrusted input, an attacker can run their own commands on the machine.

Fix: Use execFile/spawn with an argument array instead of exec; never build a shell command string from external input.

Capabilitynpm install-time lifecycle hooknot scored · severity highST-INSTALL-NPM

package.json runs scripts automatically when the package is installed.

"preinstall": "npx only-allow pnpm",

Why it matters: Install scripts are a favorite supply-chain foothold — they execute on every machine that installs the package.

Fix: Inspect the hook command. Install-time scripts are a common supply chain execution vector; ensure they do nothing beyond a documented build step.

CapabilityMCP server launches a host commandnot scored · severity highST-MCP-SERVER-EXEC

An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.

Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.

Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.

CapabilityNode.js shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
import { exec } from "node:child_process";
exec(`${cmd} "${url}"`, () => {

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

CapabilityNode.js network egressnot scored · severity mediumST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
response = await fetch(url, {
response = await fetch(`${WORKOS_BASE_URL}/user_management/authorize/device`, {
response = await fetch(`${WORKOS_BASE_URL}/user_management/authenticate`, {
const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
await fetch(TELEMETRY_URL, {
import { createServer, IncomingMessage, ServerResponse, Server } from "http";
const upstream = await fetch(`${AUTH_SERVER_URL}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`);

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

CapabilityMCP tool surface detectednot scored · severity lowST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Docfork MCP server.

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