Is Google Drive MCP server safe?
What Google Drive MCP server does
This server lets an MCP client search Google Drive and read files, exporting Google Docs to Markdown, Sheets to CSV, presentations to plain text and drawings to PNG. The npm author field lists Anthropic, PBC, and npm marks the package as no longer supported. It authenticates through a Google Cloud OAuth client you create, with the drive.readonly scope, and saves the resulting credentials to a local file (GDRIVE_CREDENTIALS_PATH). Before installing, keep the OAuth scope at drive.readonly as documented, and protect the saved credentials file, which carries the Drive access you approved.
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
- npm prepare hook
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
Google Drive MCP server is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution and mcp tools detected — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Google Drive MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (4)
The component reads files from disk.
const credentials = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(credentialsPath, "utf-8"));
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.writeFileSync(credentialsPath, JSON.stringify(auth.credentials));
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).
"prepare": "npm run build",
Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.
Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
const server = new Server({server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => {server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Google Drive MCP server.
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