Is Infranodus MCP server safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js network egress
infranodus-mcp-server is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 5 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: delegated authentication, filesystem read, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
infranodus-mcp-server 1.7.3
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Infranodus MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (5)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8");
return fs.readFileSync(path.resolve(root, candidate), "utf-8");
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const response = await fetch(`${config.apiBase}${endpoint}`, {const response = await fetch(`${BRAND_API_BASE}/userId`, {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (10 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
grant_type: "authorization_code";
* GET /oauth/authorize - Authorization endpoint (shows form)
app.get("/oauth/authorize", (req: Request, res: Response) => {<form method="POST" action="/oauth/authorize">
* POST /oauth/authorize - Process authorization (form submission)
"/oauth/authorize",
authorization_endpoint: `${baseUrl}/oauth/authorize`,* GET /.well-known/openid-configuration - OpenID Connect Discovery (some clients check this)
app.get("/.well-known/openid-configuration", (req: Request, res: Response) => {authorization_endpoint: `${baseUrl}/oauth/authorize`,Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
mcpServer.registerTool(
Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
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