SkillTotal

Is Synap Memory MCP server safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python filesystem write/delete
  • Python filesystem read
  • Python network egress

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

Synap Memory MCP server is an AI component analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).

repo

ai_component · https://github.com/maximem-ai/maximem_synap_sdk
LOW
10
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Oct 8, 2026 · repo@76aa415 · engine 0.56.4 / ruleset 62

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Synap Memory MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egress

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication
Network exposure
Interaction & Communication

Findings (8)

MEDIUMServer bound to all network interfacesST-EXPOSE-BIND

A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.

uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=settings.port, timeout_keep_alive=75)

Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.

Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

const raw = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(credPath, 'utf-8')) as Record<string, string>;
text = this.#fs.readFileSync(this.path, 'utf8');

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem write/deleteST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

fs.writeFileSync(this.credentialsPath, JSON.stringify(creds, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
try { this.#fs.unlinkSync(this.path); } catch { /* already gone */ }
this.#fs.appendFileSync(this.path, `${JSON.stringify(record)}\n`, 'utf8');

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMPython filesystem readST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython filesystem write/deleteST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

fetch(args: SynapFetchArgs): Promise<SynapFetchResponseLike>;
fetch(args: SynapFetchArgs): Promise<SynapFetchResponseLike>;
* When true (default), a fresh recall() triggers sdk.fetch(search_query=[...])
fetch(args: SynapFetchArgs): Promise<SynapFetchResponseLike>;
const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/v1/memories/create`, {
*   - ContextAssembledEvent on every fetch (any source)
await step('user.context.fetch()', async () => {
const context = await client.user.context.fetch({
await step('cross-scope fetch() produces a formatted prompt', async () => {
await client.conversation.context.fetch({ conversation_id: 'not-a-uuid' });
*  - **Namespaced, snake_case** (`client.user.context.fetch(...)`) is the
/** Options for the cross-scope `fetch()`. Snake_case, matching Python's kwargs.
/** @deprecated Use `client.user.context.fetch()`. Note it returns raw snake_case. */
/** @deprecated Use `client.customer.context.fetch()`. */
/** @deprecated Use `client.client.context.fetch()`. */
* @deprecated Use `client.user.context.fetch()` and read the typed collections.
* @deprecated Use `client.user.context.fetch()` with an empty `search_query`.

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

MEDIUMPython network egressST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

async with httpx.AsyncClient(
            base_url=settings.synap_api_url, timeout=timeout
        ) as client:
from .requests import RequestEnvelope, ResponseEnvelope
self._client = httpx.AsyncClient(
            base_url=base_url,
            timeout=httpx.Timeout(5.0),  # Short timeout for telemetry
        )
timeout=httpx.Timeout(5.0),  # Short timeout for telemetry
self._limits = httpx.Limits(
            max_connections=20,
            max_keepalive_connections=10,
            keepalive_expiry=(
                keepalive_expiry
                if keepalive_expiry is not None
                else self …
self._client = httpx.AsyncClient(
            base_url=self.base_url,
            timeout=httpx.Timeout(
                connect=self.timeouts.connect,
                read=self.timeouts.read,
                write=self.timeouts.write, …
timeout=httpx.Timeout(
                connect=self.timeouts.connect,
                read=self.timeouts.read,
                write=self.timeouts.write,
                pool=self.timeouts.connect,
            ),

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

"""Call a MAF ``@tool``-decorated function, sync or async."""
- **Tools** (`@tool`): `create_synap_tools` returns `search_memory` / `store_memory`
`create_synap_tools` returns two Smolagents `@tool` functions — `search_memory` and
``@tool`` functions for agents that don't adopt ``MemoryManager``.
Provides ``search_memory`` and ``store_memory`` as Strands ``@tool`` functions
Returns ``[search_memory, store_memory]`` as Strands ``@tool`` functions

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →