Is Unraid RMCP safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- npm install-time lifecycle hook
- Node.js filesystem read
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
Unraid RMCP is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
@dinglebear/unraid 0.3.0
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Unraid RMCP's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (5)
package.json runs scripts automatically when the package is installed.
"postinstall": "node scripts/install.js",
Why it matters: Install scripts are a favorite supply-chain foothold — they execute on every machine that installs the package.
Fix: Inspect the hook command. Install-time scripts are a common supply chain execution vector; ensure they do nothing beyond a documented build step.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");const install = spawnSync(process.execPath, [installer], { stdio: "inherit" });const child = spawnSync(binary, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: "inherit" });const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");const result = spawnSync(command, args, {const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [binPath, "--package-smoke"], {const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");const result = spawnSync("tar", ["-xzf", archive, "-C", destination], { encoding: "utf8" });Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
return fs.readFileSync(left).equals(fs.readFileSync(right));
const text = fs.readFileSync(path.join(packageRoot, relative), "utf8");
const text = fs.readFileSync(installer, "utf8");
Buffer.from(tarExtract(tarball, "package/README.md")).equals(fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, "README.md"))),
Buffer.from(tarExtract(tarball, `package/${license}`)).equals(fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, license))),hash.update(fs.readFileSync(file));
expected = checksumFromText(fs.readFileSync(sidecarFile, "utf8"), asset);
expected = checksumFromText(fs.readFileSync(manifestFile, "utf8"), asset);
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.writeFileSync(
fs.rmSync(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });const file = fs.createWriteStream(destination, { mode: 0o600 });fs.rmSync(destination, { recursive: true, force: true });fs.rmSync(destination, { force: true });} finally { fs.rmSync(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }fs.unlinkSync(packageReadme);
fs.unlinkSync(destination);
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const https = require("node:https");const request = https.request(url, { method: "HEAD" }, (response) => {const http = require("node:http");const https = require("node:https");Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Unraid RMCP.
Check your own component
Run the same evidence-backed scan on any MCP server, agent skill, or package.
Scan your own componentHow we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →