Is Unreal MCP server safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js dynamic code execution
- Dangerous MCP tool capability
What to do: The C/C++ and C# code was not checked for shell, network or file access, so this result is incomplete. Review that code before installing.
Unreal MCP server is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. Its C/C++ and C# code was not checked for shell, network or file access, so this result is partial. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
unreal-engine-mcp-server 0.6.1-beta-b
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Unreal MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (8)
The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).
'import subprocess', 'subprocess.', 'os.system', 'exec(', 'eval(','os.system', 'exec(', 'eval(', '__import__', 'with open', 'open(',Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.
Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.
An MCP tool exposes a powerful capability (files, shell, network, browser, or credentials).
"name": "control_actor",
"name": "control_editor",
"name": "inspect",
"name": "manage_pcg",
Why it matters: Wired into an agent, these grant it real access to your machine — confirm each is required.
Fix: Confirm each powerful tool is required and constrained; broad MCP tools (shell/filesystem/network) grant an agent significant host access.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';? spawnSync('cmd.exe', ['/d', '/v:off', '/s', '/c', `"${[command, ...args].map((a) => `"${a}"`).join(' ')}"`],: spawnSync(command, args, { stdio: 'inherit', env });? spawnSync('zip', ['-qr', zipPath, basename(pluginDir)], { cwd: dirname(pluginDir), stdio: 'inherit' }): spawnSync('tar', ['-a', '-c', '-f', zipPath, basename(pluginDir)], { cwd: dirname(pluginDir), stdio: 'inherit' });Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.rmSync(targetPath, { recursive: true, force: true });Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).
"prepare": "node -e \"require('fs').existsSync('dist/cli.js')||require('child_process').execSync('npm run build',{stdio:'inherit'})\"",Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.
Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.
The component makes outbound network requests.
import { type IncomingHttpHeaders, request } from 'node:http';import { request } from 'node:http';Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Unreal MCP server.
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Scan your own componentHow we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →