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SkillTotal

Is Unreal MCP server safe?

Partially analyzed - C/C++ and C# code not checked for shell, network or file access
Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Node.js dynamic code execution
  • Dangerous MCP tool capability

What to do: The C/C++ and C# code was not checked for shell, network or file access, so this result is incomplete. Review that code before installing.

Unreal MCP server is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. Its C/C++ and C# code was not checked for shell, network or file access, so this result is partial. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

unreal-engine-mcp-server 0.6.1-beta-b

GitHub repository, read as an npm package · https://github.com/ChiR24/Unreal_mcp
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Nov 13, 2026 · unreal-engine-mcp-server@0.6.1-beta-b · engine 1.1.0 / ruleset 100

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Unreal MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
dynamic code executionfilesystem readfilesystem writeinstall time executionmcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication
Supply-chain provenance risk
General Protections / Supply Chain

Findings (8)

CapabilityNode.js dynamic code executionnot scored · severity highST-DYN-NODE

The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).

'import subprocess', 'subprocess.', 'os.system', 'exec(', 'eval(',
'os.system', 'exec(', 'eval(', '__import__', 'with open', 'open(',

Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.

Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.

CapabilityDangerous MCP tool capabilitynot scored · severity highST-MCP-DANGEROUS-TOOL

An MCP tool exposes a powerful capability (files, shell, network, browser, or credentials).

Why it matters: Wired into an agent, these grant it real access to your machine — confirm each is required.

Fix: Confirm each powerful tool is required and constrained; broad MCP tools (shell/filesystem/network) grant an agent significant host access.

CapabilityNode.js shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
? spawnSync('cmd.exe', ['/d', '/v:off', '/s', '/c', `"${[command, ...args].map((a) => `"${a}"`).join(' ')}"`],
: spawnSync(command, args, { stdio: 'inherit', env });
? spawnSync('zip', ['-qr', zipPath, basename(pluginDir)], { cwd: dirname(pluginDir), stdio: 'inherit' })
: spawnSync('tar', ['-a', '-c', '-f', zipPath, basename(pluginDir)], { cwd: dirname(pluginDir), stdio: 'inherit' });

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

CapabilityNode.js filesystem readnot scored · severity mediumST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

CapabilityNode.js filesystem write/deletenot scored · severity mediumST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

fs.rmSync(targetPath, { recursive: true, force: true });

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

Capabilitynpm prepare hooknot scored · severity mediumST-INSTALL-NPM-PREPARE

package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).

"prepare": "node -e \"require('fs').existsSync('dist/cli.js')||require('child_process').execSync('npm run build',{stdio:'inherit'})\"",

Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.

Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.

CapabilityNode.js network egressnot scored · severity mediumST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

import { type IncomingHttpHeaders, request } from 'node:http';
import { request } from 'node:http';

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

CapabilityMCP tool surface detectednot scored · severity lowST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Unreal MCP server.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →