SkillTotal

Is Unreal MCP server safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Node.js dynamic code execution
  • Dangerous MCP tool capability

unreal-engine-mcp-server is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 8 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

unreal-engine-mcp-server 0.6.0-beta-b

npm_package · https://github.com/ChiR24/Unreal_mcp
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Sep 29, 2026 · unreal-engine-mcp-server@0.6.0-beta-b · engine 0.53.0 / ruleset 60

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Unreal MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
dynamic code executionfilesystem readfilesystem writeinstall time executionmcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication
Supply-chain provenance risk
General Protections / Supply Chain

Findings (8)

HIGHNode.js dynamic code executionST-DYN-NODE

The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).

'import subprocess', 'subprocess.', 'os.system', 'exec(', 'eval(',
'os.system', 'exec(', 'eval(', '__import__', 'with open', 'open(',

Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.

Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.

HIGHDangerous MCP tool capabilityST-MCP-DANGEROUS-TOOL

An MCP tool exposes a powerful capability (files, shell, network, browser, or credentials).

Why it matters: Wired into an agent, these grant it real access to your machine — confirm each is required.

Fix: Confirm each powerful tool is required and constrained; broad MCP tools (shell/filesystem/network) grant an agent significant host access.

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
? spawnSync('cmd.exe', ['/d', '/s', '/c', `"${[command, ...args].map((a) => `"${a}"`).join(' ')}"`],
: spawnSync(command, args, { stdio: 'inherit', env });
? spawnSync('zip', ['-qr', zipPath, basename(pluginDir)], { cwd: dirname(pluginDir), stdio: 'inherit' })
: spawnSync('tar', ['-a', '-c', '-f', zipPath, basename(pluginDir)], { cwd: dirname(pluginDir), stdio: 'inherit' });

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem write/deleteST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

fs.rmSync(targetPath, { recursive: true, force: true });

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMnpm prepare hookST-INSTALL-NPM-PREPARE

package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).

"prepare": "node -e \"const fs=require('fs');(fs.existsSync('dist')&&fs.existsSync('dist/cli.js')&&fs.existsSync('dist/index.js'))||require('child_process').execSync('npm run build',{stdio:'inherit'})\"",

Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.

Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

return (await this.ensureConnected()) ? jsonResource(uri, await fetch()) : disconnectedResource(uri);

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →