Is Waystation Ai MCP server safe?

@waystation/mcp is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 6 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 20/100 (low).

@waystation/mcp 0.3.1

npm_package · https://github.com/waystation-ai/mcp

LOW

/ 100 malicious-risk

Snapshot · scanned Jun 20, 2026 · @waystation/mcp@0.3.1 · engine 0.18.0 / ruleset 19

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing

Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):

Node.js shell/command execution
Possible command injection (exec with dynamic command)
Node.js filesystem read

No malicious indicators found by static analysis.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):

filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Findings (6)

HIGHPossible command injection (exec with dynamic command)ST-CMDI-NODE

The code builds an OS command out of values that can change at runtime, then runs it through a shell.

src/index.ts:159-159

execSync(`start "" "${wayStationPath}"`, { shell: 'cmd.exe' });

src/index.ts:183-183

execSync(`osascript -e "${escapeAppleScriptString(applescript)}"`);

Why it matters: If any of those values come from untrusted input, an attacker can run their own commands on the machine.

Fix: Use execFile/spawn with an argument array instead of exec; never build a shell command string from external input.

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

src/index.ts:8-8

import { execSync } from 'child_process';

src/index.ts:159-159

execSync(`start "" "${wayStationPath}"`, { shell: 'cmd.exe' });

src/index.ts:183-183

execSync(`osascript -e "${escapeAppleScriptString(applescript)}"`);

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

src/index.ts:43-43

tokenKey = fs.readFileSync(tokenPath, 'utf8').trim();

src/index.ts:58-58

tokenKey = fs.readFileSync(tokenPath, 'utf8').trim();

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem write/deleteST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

src/index.ts:150-150

fs.writeFileSync(onboardingFile, 'true');

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

src/index.ts:79-79

const response = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/tools/list`, {

src/index.ts:214-214

const response = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/tools/call`, {

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

server.json:1-1

src/index.ts:71-71

const server = new Server({name: "waystation",version: "0.2.2"}, {capabilities: { tools: {} }});

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

Check your own component

Run the same evidence-backed scan on any MCP server, agent skill, or package.

Scan your own component

Or get notified if this component's risk changes:

How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →