Is WayStation MCP server safe?

Low risk - review the findings before installing

Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):

Possible command injection (exec with dynamic command)
Node.js shell/command execution
Node.js filesystem read

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

WayStation MCP server is an MCP server analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 20/100 (low).

@waystation/mcp 0.3.1

GitHub repository, read as an npm package · https://github.com/waystation-ai/mcp

LOW

/ 100 risk score

Snapshot · scanned Nov 13, 2026 · @waystation/mcp@0.3.1 · engine 1.1.0 / ruleset 100

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of WayStation MCP server's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):

filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface

Tool Usage

Execution authority

Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access

Filesystem reach

Tool Execution Context

Network egress

Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (6)

HIGHPossible command injection (exec with dynamic command)ST-CMDI-NODE

The code builds an OS command out of values that can change at runtime, then runs it through a shell.

src/index.ts:159

execSync(`start "" "${wayStationPath}"`, { shell: 'cmd.exe' });

src/index.ts:183

execSync(`osascript -e "${escapeAppleScriptString(applescript)}"`);

Why it matters: If any of those values come from untrusted input, an attacker can run their own commands on the machine.

Fix: Use execFile/spawn with an argument array instead of exec; never build a shell command string from external input.

CapabilityNode.js shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

src/index.ts:8

import { execSync } from 'child_process';

src/index.ts:159

execSync(`start "" "${wayStationPath}"`, { shell: 'cmd.exe' });

src/index.ts:183

execSync(`osascript -e "${escapeAppleScriptString(applescript)}"`);

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

CapabilityNode.js filesystem readnot scored · severity mediumST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

src/index.ts:43

tokenKey = fs.readFileSync(tokenPath, 'utf8').trim();

src/index.ts:58

tokenKey = fs.readFileSync(tokenPath, 'utf8').trim();

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

CapabilityNode.js filesystem write/deletenot scored · severity mediumST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

src/index.ts:150

fs.writeFileSync(onboardingFile, 'true');

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

CapabilityNode.js network egressnot scored · severity mediumST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

src/index.ts:79

const response = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/tools/list`, {

src/index.ts:214

const response = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/tools/call`, {

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

CapabilityMCP tool surface detectednot scored · severity lowST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

server.json:1

src/index.ts:71

const server = new Server({name: "waystation",version: "0.2.2"}, {capabilities: { tools: {} }});

src/index.ts:73

server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => {

src/index.ts:135

server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {

src/index.ts:227

const transport = new StdioServerTransport();

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in WayStation MCP server.

RCE via Tool Arguments lab

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →