Is acpx safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
acpx is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
acpx 0.22.0
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of acpx's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (4)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";import { spawn } from "node:child_process";const child = spawn(spec.command, args, {import { spawn } from "node:child_process";const proc = spawn(spawnCommand.command, spawnCommand.args, spawnOptions);
spawnedChild = spawn(launch.command, [...launch.args], {child = spawn(launch.command, [...launch.args], {const child = spawn(process.execPath, queueOwnerArgs ?? resolveQueueOwnerSpawnArgs(), {Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
return [...fs.readFileSync(wrapperPath, "utf8").matchAll(/"([^"\r\n]*)"/g)].map((match) => resolveWindowsWrapperToken(match[1] ?? "", wrapperPath)).find((candidate) => candidate !== void 0);
if (JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8")).name === packageName) return candidateRoot;
return parseJsonInput(await fs.readFile(inputPath, "utf8"), "--input-file");
const payload = await fs$1.readFile(sessionEventLockPath(recordId), "utf8");
const parsed = parseArchive(await fs$1.readFile(archivePath, "utf8"));
const source = filePath === "-" ? await text(process.stdin) : await fs$1.readFile(path.resolve(cwd, filePath), "utf8");
const payload = await fs$1.readFile(filePath, "utf8");
const raw = await fs.readFile(policyPath, "utf8");
const payload = await fs$1.readFile(file, "utf8");
payload = await fs$1.readFile(sessionFilePath(sessionId), "utf8");
return { targetStat: await fs.readFile('/proc/' + targetPid + '/stat', 'utf8').catch(() => null) };try { stat = await fs.readFile('/proc/' + pid + '/stat', 'utf8'); }fs.readFile('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id', 'utf8'),fs.readFile('/proc/self/stat', 'utf8'),const raw = await fs$1.readFile(lockPath, "utf8");
const payload = await fs$1.readFile(lockPath, "utf8");
const raw = await fs$1.readFile(lockPath, "utf8");
return current.isFile() && current.dev === observed.dev && current.ino === observed.ino && current.mtimeNs === observed.mtimeNs && await fs$1.readFile(lockPath, "utf8") === raw;
payload: await fs$1.readFile(filePath, "utf8")
return (await fs$1.readFile(`/proc/${pid}/cmdline`, "utf8")).split("\0").map((entry) => entry.trim()).filter((entry) => entry.length > 0);payload = await fs.readFile(this.filePath(sessionId), "utf8");
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
await fs$1.writeFile(configPath, `${JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2)}\n`, {await fs$1.unlink(filePath).catch(() => void 0);
if (matchesReservation(value, expected) && !hasQueueRetirementReceipt(value)) await fs$1.unlink(lockPath);
await fs$1.unlink(socketPath);
await fs$1.unlink(queueLockFilePath(sessionId)).catch((error) => {await fs$1.writeFile(lockPath, payload, {await fs$1.writeFile(tempPath, `${payload}\n`, {fs.unlinkSync(file);
await fs$1.unlink(sessionEventSegmentPath(sessionId, limit)).catch((error) => {await fs$1.unlink(filePath).catch((error) => {await fs$1.writeFile(temporaryPath, payload, {await fs$1.writeFile(filePath, payload, {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).
"prepare": "husky",
Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.
Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in acpx.
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Scan your own componentHow we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →