Is acpx safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
acpx is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 4 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
acpx 0.19.3
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of acpx's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (4)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";import { spawn } from "node:child_process";const child = spawn(spec.command, args, {import { spawn } from "node:child_process";const proc = spawn(spawnCommand.command, spawnCommand.args, spawnOptions);
spawnedChild = spawn(launch.command, [...launch.args], {child = spawn(launch.command, [...launch.args], {const child = spawn(process.execPath, queueOwnerArgs ?? resolveQueueOwnerSpawnArgs(), {Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
return [...fs.readFileSync(wrapperPath, "utf8").matchAll(/"([^"\r\n]*)"/g)].map((match) => resolveWindowsWrapperToken(match[1] ?? "", wrapperPath)).find((candidate) => candidate !== void 0);
if (JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8")).name === packageName) return candidateRoot;
return parseJsonInput(await fs.readFile(inputPath, "utf8"), "--input-file");
const source = await fs.readFile(flowPath, "utf8");
const raw = await fs.readFile(policyPath, "utf8");
return { targetStat: await fs.readFile('/proc/' + targetPid + '/stat', 'utf8').catch(() => null) };try { stat = await fs.readFile('/proc/' + pid + '/stat', 'utf8'); }fs.readFile('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id', 'utf8'),fs.readFile('/proc/self/stat', 'utf8'),payload = await fs.readFile(this.filePath(sessionId), "utf8");
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
await fs.rm(tempPath, { force: true });fs.unlinkSync(file);
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).
"prepare": "husky",
Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.
Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.
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