Is agentfootprint safe?
- Node.js dynamic code execution
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
agentfootprint is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: delegated authentication, dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, network egress and scoped identity — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
agentfootprint 12.3.0
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of agentfootprint's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (6)
The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).
const result = (await this.client.eval(PUT_IF_VERSION_LUA, 2, eKey, idxKey, String(expectedVersion), payload, entry.id, px));
await this.client.eval(FEEDBACK_LUA, 1, fbKey, String(clamped));
eval(script: string, numKeys: number, ...args: ReadonlyArray<string | number>): Promise<unknown>;
const result = (await this.client.eval(PUT_IF_VERSION_LUA, 2, eKey, idxKey, String(expectedVersion), payload, entry.id, px));
await this.client.eval(FEEDBACK_LUA, 1, fbKey, String(clamped));
eval(script: string, numKeys: number, ...args: ReadonlyArray<string | number>): Promise<unknown>;
Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.
Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.
The component reads files from disk.
raw = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
body: stream.Readable.toWeb(fs.createReadStream(file)),
return new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(payloadFileFor(scope, ref)));
raw = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
body: stream.Readable.toWeb(fs.createReadStream(file)),
return new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(payloadFileFor(scope, ref)));
const bytes = new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(filePath));
const bytes = new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(filePath));
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.appendFileSync(path, '');
await fs.appendFile(path, data);
fs.rmSync(fileFor(scope, ref), { force: true });fs.rmSync(payloadFileFor(scope, ref), { force: true });fs.writeFileSync(fileFor(scope, meta.ref), JSON.stringify(envelope));
fs.rmSync(payloadFile, { force: true });fs.writeFileSync(fileFor(scope, stated.ref), JSON.stringify(envelope));
fs.appendFileSync(path, '');
await fs.appendFile(path, data);
fs.rmSync(fileFor(scope, ref), { force: true });fs.rmSync(payloadFileFor(scope, ref), { force: true });fs.writeFileSync(fileFor(scope, meta.ref), JSON.stringify(envelope));
fs.rmSync(payloadFile, { force: true });fs.writeFileSync(fileFor(scope, stated.ref), JSON.stringify(envelope));
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
throw new TypeError('[identity] oidcIdentity needs a global fetch (Node 18+) to read the discovery document, ' +return (url, init) => fetch(url, init);
const doFetch = options._fetch ?? ((...args) => fetch(...args));
const res = await options.fetch(url, {const fetchImpl = options._fetch ?? ((...args) => fetch(...args));
const fetchImpl = options.fetch ?? ((input, init) => fetch(input, init));
const fetchImpl = options._fetch ?? ((...args) => fetch(...args));
return innerFetch ? innerFetch(input, next) : globalThis.fetch(input, next);
const memory = await this.fetch(this.nameOf(wanted, id));
const existing = await this.fetch(name);
async fetch(name) {const existing = await this.fetch(name);
const doFetch = options._fetch ?? ((...args) => fetch(...args));
const doFetch = options._fetch ?? ((...args) => fetch(...args));
return await (0, abort_js_1.untilAborted)(fetch(url, { method: 'POST', headers, body, signal: controller.signal }), signal);const res = await fetch(url, {import type { IncomingMessage, Server, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';import type { IncomingMessage, Server, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';throw new TypeError('[identity] oidcIdentity needs a global fetch (Node 18+) to read the discovery document, ' +return (url, init) => fetch(url, init);
const doFetch = options._fetch ?? ((...args) => fetch(...args));
const res = await options.fetch(url, {const fetchImpl = options._fetch ?? ((...args) => fetch(...args));
const fetchImpl = options.fetch ?? ((input, init) => fetch(input, init));
const fetchImpl = options._fetch ?? ((...args) => fetch(...args));
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (16 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
authorization_endpoint: issuer.authorizationEndpoint,
if (typeof tokens.id_token !== 'string' || tokens.id_token.length === 0) {return `the IdP's discovery document names no ${issuer.authorizationEndpoint === undefined ? 'authorization_endpoint' : 'token_endpoint'}, so a browser cannot sign in through it`;const spec = 'openid-client';
return (0, lazyRequire_js_1.lazyRequire)('openid-client');['authorization_endpoint', 'authorizationEndpoint'],
return `${(0, linearText_js_1.trimTrailing)(issuer, linearText_js_1.isSlash)}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;id_token?: string;
authorization_endpoint: issuer.authorizationEndpoint,
if (typeof tokens.id_token !== 'string' || tokens.id_token.length === 0) {return `the IdP's discovery document names no ${issuer.authorizationEndpoint === undefined ? 'authorization_endpoint' : 'token_endpoint'}, so a browser cannot sign in through it`;const spec = 'openid-client';
return lazyRequire('openid-client');['authorization_endpoint', 'authorizationEndpoint'],
return `${trimTrailing(issuer, isSlash)}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;id_token?: string;
Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
A short-lived, scoped, assumed identity was detected - an STS AssumeRole / session token, a cloud managed or workload identity, an impersonated service account, a projected Kubernetes service-account token, or a dynamic-secret broker. Tools authenticate with a narrowly-scoped credential that expires, rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (24 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
if (typeof mod.DefaultAzureCredential !== 'function') {`\`DefaultAzureCredential\`. This adapter is built against the 4.x package — ` +
cache.credential = new mod.DefaultAzureCredential();
` It vends the DEPLOYMENT's Entra credential (the DefaultAzureCredential ` +
throw sdkFailure('new DefaultAzureCredential', err);` Every rung of the DefaultAzureCredential chain was tried: environment service ` +
`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS at a service-account key or a workload-identity ` +
if (typeof sdk.DefaultAzureCredential !== 'function') {throw new Error(`${ADAPTER}: \`@azure/identity\` is installed but exports no \`DefaultAzureCredential\`.\n` +const chain = new sdk.DefaultAzureCredential();
'audience (DefaultAzureCredential walks env service principal → workload identity → ' +
readonly DefaultAzureCredential?: new () => TokenCredentialLike;
if (typeof mod.DefaultAzureCredential !== 'function') {`\`DefaultAzureCredential\`. This adapter is built against the 4.x package — ` +
cache.credential = new mod.DefaultAzureCredential();
` It vends the DEPLOYMENT's Entra credential (the DefaultAzureCredential ` +
throw sdkFailure('new DefaultAzureCredential', err);` Every rung of the DefaultAzureCredential chain was tried: environment service ` +
`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS at a service-account key or a workload-identity ` +
if (typeof sdk.DefaultAzureCredential !== 'function') {throw new Error(`${ADAPTER}: \`@azure/identity\` is installed but exports no \`DefaultAzureCredential\`.\n` +const chain = new sdk.DefaultAzureCredential();
'audience (DefaultAzureCredential walks env service principal → workload identity → ' +
readonly DefaultAzureCredential?: new () => TokenCredentialLike;
Fix: A scoped, short-lived identity is the smallest-blast-radius execution context. Confirm the assumed role / requested scope grants only the permissions the tool needs, and that the token lifetime is minimal.
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