Is @ai-sdk/mcp safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Delegated authentication (OAuth 2.0 / OIDC)
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
@ai-sdk/mcp is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: delegated authentication and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
@ai-sdk/
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of @ai-sdk/mcp's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (2)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { IOType } from "node:child_process";import spawn from "cross-spawn";
import type { ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process';import spawn from 'cross-spawn';
return spawn(config.command, config.args ?? [], {import type { ChildProcess, IOType } from 'node:child_process';Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (17 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
id_token: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
authorization_endpoint: z.ZodString;
authorization_endpoint: z.ZodString;
id_token: z.string().optional(),
authorization_endpoint: SafeUrlSchema,
authorization_endpoint: SafeUrlSchema,
url: new URL("/.well-known/openid-configuration", url.origin),url: new URL(`/.well-known/openid-configuration${pathname}`, url.origin),oidcDiscoveryUrl.pathname = `${pathname}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;authorizationUrl = new URL(metadata.authorization_endpoint);
id_token: z.string().optional(), // Optional for OAuth 2.1, but necessary in OpenID Connect
authorization_endpoint: SafeUrlSchema,
authorization_endpoint: SafeUrlSchema,
url: new URL('/.well-known/openid-configuration', url.origin),url: new URL(`/.well-known/openid-configuration${pathname}`, url.origin),oidcDiscoveryUrl.pathname = `${pathname}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;authorizationUrl = new URL(metadata.authorization_endpoint);
Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in @ai-sdk/mcp.
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