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SkillTotal

Is ai-sdk-provider-codex-cli safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Node.js network egress
  • npm prepare hook

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

ai-sdk-provider-codex-cli is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: install time execution, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

ai-sdk-provider-codex-cli 2.4.0

npm package · npm:ai-sdk-provider-codex-cli
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Nov 13, 2026 · ai-sdk-provider-codex-cli@2.4.0 · engine 1.1.0 / ruleset 100

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of ai-sdk-provider-codex-cli's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
install time executionnetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication
Supply-chain provenance risk
General Protections / Supply Chain

Findings (3)

CapabilityNode.js shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { spawn } from 'child_process';
const child = spawn(cmd, args, { env, cwd, stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] });
this.child = spawn(base.cmd, args, {

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

Capabilitynpm prepare hooknot scored · severity mediumST-INSTALL-NPM-PREPARE

package.json has a 'prepare' script (runs on git/local installs and before publishing).

"prepare": "npm run build",

Why it matters: Usually a build step, but confirm it doesn't fetch or run remote code.

Fix: Usually a legitimate build step; confirm it only builds and does not fetch or execute remote code.

CapabilityNode.js network egressnot scored · severity mediumST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

import { createServer } from 'http';

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in ai-sdk-provider-codex-cli.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →