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SkillTotal

Is @arbidocs/tui safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Node.js filesystem read
  • Node.js filesystem write/delete

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

@arbidocs/tui is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

@arbidocs/tui 0.5.120

npm package · npm:@arbidocs/tui
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Nov 1, 2026 · @arbidocs/tui@0.5.120 · engine 0.89.0 / ruleset 88

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of @arbidocs/tui's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writeshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context

Findings (3)

CapabilityNode.js shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

var child_process = require('child_process');
const child = child_process.spawnSync(editor, [path$1], { stdio: "inherit" });

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

CapabilityNode.js filesystem readnot scored · severity mediumST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

return fs.readFileSync(path$1, "utf8");

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

CapabilityNode.js filesystem write/deletenot scored · severity mediumST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

fs.writeFileSync(path$1, original, "utf8");
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in @arbidocs/tui.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →