Is @hasna/domains safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- npm install-time lifecycle hook
- Node.js filesystem read
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
@hasna/domains is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, install time execution, mcp tools detected, network egress, scoped identity and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
@hasna/
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of @hasna/domains's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (6)
package.json runs scripts automatically when the package is installed.
"postinstall": "node postinstall.js",
Why it matters: Install scripts are a favorite supply-chain foothold — they execute on every machine that installs the package.
Fix: Inspect the hook command. Install-time scripts are a common supply chain execution vector; ensure they do nothing beyond a documented build step.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
var childProcess = __require("child_process");proc = childProcess.spawn(process2.argv[0], args, { stdio: "inherit" });proc = childProcess.spawn(executableFile, args, { stdio: "inherit" });proc = childProcess.spawn(process2.execPath, args, { stdio: "inherit" });import { spawnSync } from "child_process";const result = spawnSync(KEYCHAIN_SECURITY_BIN, [...argv], {import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { exec } from "child_process";import { execFile } from "child_process";import { execFile as execFile2 } from "child_process";import { spawn } from "child_process";const child = spawn(channel.command.command, channel.command.args ?? [], {import { execSync } from "child_process";execSync("whois --version 2>/dev/null || whois example.com 2>/dev/null", { timeout: 3000 });import { execSync as execSync2 } from "child_process";import { exec } from "child_process";import { spawnSync } from "child_process";const result = spawnSync(KEYCHAIN_SECURITY_BIN, [...argv], {import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { exec } from "child_process";import { spawnSync } from "child_process";const result = spawnSync(KEYCHAIN_SECURITY_BIN, [...argv], {import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { spawnSync } from "child_process";const result = spawnSync(KEYCHAIN_SECURITY_BIN, [...argv], {Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
request.headers.Authorization = validateToken((await fs.readFile(tokenFile)).toString());
request.headers.Authorization = validateToken((await fs.readFile(tokenFile)).toString());
request.headers.Authorization = validateToken((await fs.readFile(tokenFile)).toString());
request.headers.Authorization = validateToken((await fs.readFile(tokenFile)).toString());
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? ((input, init) => fetch(input, init));
return this.http.get(`/offers/${enc(id)}`).catch(() => null);const res = await this.http.get(`/domains/${enc(domainId)}/offers`);return this.http.get(`/emails/${enc(id)}`).catch(() => null);const res = await this.http.get(`/domains/${enc(domainId)}/emails`);const res = await this.http.get(`/domains/${enc(domainId)}/dns`, { query: q({ type }) });const res = await this.http.get(`/domains/${enc(domainId)}/alerts`);const res = await this.http.get(`/domains/${enc(domainId)}/owners`);const res = await this.http.get(`/owners-portfolio`);
const res = await this.http.get(`/domains/${enc(domainId)}/history`, {const res = await this.http.get(`/history`, {const res = await this.http.get(`/history-changes`);
return this.http.get(`/domains/${enc(domainId)}/reputation`).catch(() => null);const response = await fetch(url, {const response = await fetch(url, {const { request } = __require("http");import node_http from "http";
const req = node_http.request({var node_https = __require("https");const node_http = __require("http");const response = await fetch(`${CF_BASE}${path}`, {const resp = await fetch(url);
import { promises as dns } from "dns";return dns.resolveNs(name).catch(() => []);
const response = await fetch(`https://${input.hostname}/`, {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
A short-lived, scoped, assumed identity was detected - an STS AssumeRole / session token, a cloud managed or workload identity, an impersonated service account, a projected Kubernetes service-account token, or a dynamic-secret broker. Tools authenticate with a narrowly-scoped credential that expires, rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (25 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
case "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity": {var _AR = "AssumeRole";
var _ARWWI = "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity";
var AssumeRole$ = [
var AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$ = [
class AssumeRoleCommand extends command(_ep0, _mw0, "AssumeRole", AssumeRole$) {class AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityCommand extends command(_ep0, _mw0, "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$) {exports.AssumeRole$ = AssumeRole$;
exports.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$ = AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$;
case "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity": {var _AR = "AssumeRole";
var _ARWWI = "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity";
var AssumeRole$ = [
var AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$ = [
class AssumeRoleCommand extends command(_ep0, _mw0, "AssumeRole", AssumeRole$) {class AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityCommand extends command(_ep0, _mw0, "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$) {exports.AssumeRole$ = AssumeRole$;
exports.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$ = AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$;
case "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity": {var _AR = "AssumeRole";
var _ARWWI = "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity";
var AssumeRole$ = [
var AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$ = [
class AssumeRoleCommand extends command(_ep0, _mw0, "AssumeRole", AssumeRole$) {class AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityCommand extends command(_ep0, _mw0, "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity$) {Fix: A scoped, short-lived identity is the smallest-blast-radius execution context. Confirm the assumed role / requested scope grants only the permissions the tool needs, and that the token lifetime is minimal.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
const server = new McpServer({server.registerTool("create_domain", {server.registerTool("get_domain", {server.registerTool("list_domains", {server.registerTool("update_domain", {server.registerTool("mark_domain_premium", {server.registerTool("add_domain_offer", {server.registerTool("list_domain_offers", {server.registerTool("update_domain_status", {server.registerTool("record_domain_purchase", {server.registerTool("link_domain_email", {server.registerTool("get_domain_emails", {server.registerTool("delete_domain", {server.registerTool("search_domains", {server.registerTool("count_domains", {server.registerTool("list_expiring_domains", {server.registerTool("list_ssl_expiring", {server.registerTool("get_domains_by_registrar", {server.registerTool("get_domain_stats", {server.registerTool("create_dns_record", {server.registerTool("list_dns_records", {server.registerTool("update_dns_record", {server.registerTool("delete_dns_record", {server.registerTool("create_alert", {server.registerTool("list_alerts", {Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in @hasna/domains.
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