SkillTotal

Is @langchain/anthropic safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Node.js filesystem read
  • Node.js filesystem write/delete

@langchain/anthropic is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 4 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

@langchain/anthropic 1.5.11

npm_package · npm:@langchain/anthropic
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Sep 25, 2026 · @langchain/anthropic@1.5.11 · engine 0.53.0 / ruleset 60

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of @langchain/anthropic's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writenetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (4)

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

* import { execSync } from "child_process";
*       const output = execSync(args.command!, {
* import { execSync } from "child_process";
*       const output = execSync(args.command!, {
* import { execSync } from "child_process";
*       const output = execSync(args.command!, {

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

*       const content = fs.readFileSync(args.path, "utf-8");
*       let content = fs.readFileSync(args.path, "utf-8");
*       const content = fs.readFileSync(args.path, "utf-8");
*       let content = fs.readFileSync(args.path, "utf-8");
*       const content = fs.readFileSync(args.path, "utf-8");
*       let content = fs.readFileSync(args.path, "utf-8");

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem write/deleteST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

*       fs.writeFileSync(args.path, content);
*       fs.writeFileSync(args.path, content);
*       fs.writeFileSync(args.path, content);

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());
* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());
* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →