Is @langchain/openai safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
@langchain/openai is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 4 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
@langchain/openai 1.6.0
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of @langchain/openai's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (4)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
* import { exec } from "child_process";* const result = await exec(action.command.join(' '), {* import { exec } from "child_process";* import { exec } from "child_process";Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
* const current = await fs.readFile(operation.path, "utf-8");
* const current = await fs.readFile(operation.path, "utf-8");
* const current = await fs.readFile(operation.path, "utf-8");
* const current = await fs.readFile(operation.path, "utf-8");
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
* await fs.writeFile(operation.path, content);
* await fs.writeFile(operation.path, newContent);
* await fs.unlink(operation.path);
* await fs.writeFile(operation.path, content);
* await fs.writeFile(operation.path, newContent);
* await fs.unlink(operation.path);
* await fs.writeFile(operation.path, content);
* await fs.writeFile(operation.path, newContent);
* await fs.unlink(operation.path);
* await fs.writeFile(operation.path, content);
* await fs.writeFile(operation.path, newContent);
* await fs.unlink(operation.path);
* fs.writeFileSync("output.png", Buffer.from(imageData.result, "base64"));* fs.writeFileSync("output.png", Buffer.from(imageData.result, "base64"));* fs.writeFileSync("output.png", Buffer.from(imageData.result, "base64"));Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());
* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());
* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());
* Additional options to pass to the underlying axios request.
* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());
* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());
* const imageData = await fetch(imageUrl).then(res => res.arrayBuffer());
* Additional options to pass to the underlying axios request.
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
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