Is llamaindex safe?
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
- Node.js network egress
llamaindex is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 3 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
llamaindex 0.12.1
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of llamaindex's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (3)
The component reads files from disk.
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const response = await fetch(url, {const response = await fetch(url, {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
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