Is llamaindex safe?
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
- Node.js network egress
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
llamaindex is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
llamaindex 0.12.1
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of llamaindex's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (3)
The component reads files from disk.
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await env.fs.readFile(persistPath);
const fileData = await fs.readFile(persistPath);
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await env.fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
await fs.writeFile(persistPath, JSON.stringify(data));
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const response = await fetch(url, {const response = await fetch(url, {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
Check your own component
Run the same evidence-backed scan on any MCP server, agent skill, or package.
Scan your own componentHow we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →