Is @microsoft/teams.apps safe?
- Node.js network egress
- Delegated authentication (OAuth 2.0 / OIDC)
@microsoft/teams.apps is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 2 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: delegated authentication and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
@microsoft/teams.apps 2.1.0
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of @microsoft/teams.apps's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (2)
The component makes outbound network requests.
const axios_1 = require("axios");return fromFetchResponse(await options.fetch(url, {// We map 401/403 onto typed errors ourselves, so keep axios from throwing first.
import { AxiosError } from 'axios';const axios_1 = require("axios");const axios_1 = require("axios");* URLs (e.g. `fetch('https://' + domain)`). Use the `debugCspViolations`* URLs (e.g. `fetch('https://' + domain)`). Use the `debugCspViolations`// connectDomains: fetch(), XMLHttpRequest.open(), new WebSocket(), new EventSource()
{ regex: /fetch\(\s*["']([^"']+)["']/gi, source: 'fetch()' },Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (12 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
* The concrete token machinery: MSAL clients, credential resolution, and the
* The concrete token machinery: MSAL clients, credential resolution, and the
* The MSAL entra token.
* Returned as a callback rather than a token because MSAL resolves client
* Also returns the MSAL client so callers that need to climb to rung 3 can
const msal_node_1 = require("@azure/msal-node");this._msalLogger = this.logger.child('azure/msal-node', {// Msal logging is fairly noisy. So we keep it quiet unless the user
pattern: '-azure/msal-node'
* Returned as a callback rather than a token because MSAL resolves client
* Also returns the MSAL client so callers that need to climb to rung 3 can
// There's a bug in MSAL where it warns this on all requests.
Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
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