Is paqad-ai safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- npm install-time lifecycle hook
- Node.js dynamic code execution
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
paqad-ai is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: delegated authentication, dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
paqad-ai 1.128.1
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of paqad-ai's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (7)
The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).
const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode);Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.
Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.
package.json runs scripts automatically when the package is installed.
"postinstall": "node runtime/scripts/postinstall.mjs",
Why it matters: Install scripts are a favorite supply-chain foothold — they execute on every machine that installs the package.
Fix: Inspect the hook command. Install-time scripts are a common supply chain execution vector; ensure they do nothing beyond a documented build step.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { execFileSync as execFileSync2 } from "child_process";import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { execFileSync, spawn } from "child_process";const child = spawn(process.execPath, engineInstallArguments(), {import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { execFileSync } from "child_process";import { ChildProcess } from "child_process";import { spawnSync } from "child_process";import { execFile as execFileCallback, execFileSync as execFileSyncOriginal } from "child_process";import { spawn } from "child_process";import { ChildProcess as ChildProcess2 } from "child_process";import { execFile } from "child_process";subprocess = spawn(...concatenateShell(file, commandArguments, getSpawnOptions(options)));
import { execFileSync as execFileSync5 } from "child_process";import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "child_process";const result2 = spawnSync(bin, [...args], {import childProcess from "child_process";
proc = childProcess.spawn(process2.argv[0], args, { stdio: "inherit" });proc = childProcess.spawn(executableFile, args, { stdio: "inherit" });proc = childProcess.spawn(process2.execPath, args, { stdio: "inherit" });import { execFileSync as execFileSync2 } from "child_process";Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
var templateString = fs.readFileSync(filename, "utf8");
text = fs.readFileSync(fd, 'utf8');
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.appendFileSync(file, line, 'utf8');
fs.rmSync(lock, { force: true });if (pruned !== '') fs.appendFileSync(file, pruned, 'utf8');
fs.appendFileSync(file, tail, 'utf8');
fs.rmSync(compacting, { force: true });fs.rmSync(lock, { force: true });fs.appendFileSync(file, line, 'utf8');
fs.writeFileSync(tmp, pruned, 'utf8');
fs.rmSync(tmp, { force: true });Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const response = await fetch("https://api.osv.dev/v1/querybatch", {"axios"
const response = await fetch("https://api.cohere.com/v1/rerank", {{ smell: "network-io", signal: "axios", pattern: /\baxios\b/ },import { createServer } from "http";const response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (9 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
"next-auth",
"next-auth",
nextjs: ["app-router", "pages-router", "tailwind", "prisma", "trpc", "next-auth", "docker"],
"next-auth": "next-auth",
"@auth/core": "next-auth",
"next-auth",
"next-auth",
declare const CAPABILITIES: readonly ["inertia", "vue", "react", "tailwind", "boost", "pest", "phpunit", "docker", "compose", "sail", "next", "remix", "vite-spa", "gatsby", "nuxt", "quasar", "blazor", "ef-core", "minimal-api", "mvc", "razor …
declare const SUPPORTED_CAPABILITIES: readonly ["inertia", "vue", "react", "tailwind", "boost", "pest", "phpunit", "docker", "compose", "sail", "next", "remix", "vite-spa", "gatsby", "nuxt", "quasar", "blazor", "ef-core", "minimal-api", "mv …
Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in paqad-ai.
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