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SkillTotal

Is socraticode safe?

Partially analyzed - 1 code file not read (1 minified)
Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • MCP server launches a host command
  • Node.js filesystem read

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

socraticode is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

socraticode 1.16.2

npm package · npm:socraticode
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Nov 13, 2026 · socraticode@1.16.2 · engine 1.1.0 / ruleset 100

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of socraticode's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (6)

CapabilityMCP server launches a host commandnot scored · severity highST-MCP-SERVER-EXEC

An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.

"command": "npx",

Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.

Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.

CapabilityNode.js shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
const { stdout } = await exec("git", args, {
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
const { stdout } = await exec("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", timeout: 5_000, maxBuffer: 4 * 1024 * 1024, windowsHide: true });
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
execSync(`taskkill /F /PID ${pid}`, { stdio: "ignore" });

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

CapabilityNode.js filesystem readnot scored · severity mediumST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

const raw = fs.readFileSync(configPath, "utf-8");
const src = await fs.readFile(path.join(resolvedPath, relPath), "utf-8");
source = await fs.readFile(absolutePath, "utf-8");
const raw = await fsp.readFile(actualPath, "utf-8");
const content = await fsp.readFile(resolved, "utf-8");
const buf = await fsp.readFile(filePath);
const raw = await fs.readFile(configPath, "utf-8");
raw = await fs.readFile(resolved, "utf-8");
return await fs.readFile(path.resolve(root, relativePath), "utf-8");
raw = fs.readFileSync(absolute, "utf8");
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "cytoscape.min.js"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "dagre.min.js"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "cytoscape-dagre.js"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "viewer-styles.css"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "viewer-app.js"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "viewer-template.html"), "utf-8"),
const content = fs.readFileSync(rootGitignore, "utf-8");
const content = fs.readFileSync(socraticodeignorePath, "utf-8");
const content = fs.readFileSync(gitignorePath, "utf-8");
const content = await fsp.readFile(absolutePath, "utf-8");
const content = await fsp.readFile(absolutePath, "utf-8");
const id = (await fs.readFile(file, "utf8")).trim();
raw = await fs.readFile(path.join(projectPath, ".socraticode.json"), "utf8");
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8").trim();

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

CapabilityNode.js filesystem write/deletenot scored · severity mediumST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

await fs.writeFile(file, html, "utf-8");
await fs.writeFile(file, `${randomUUID()}\n`, { flag: "wx", mode: 0o600 });
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, `${process.pid}\n`, "utf-8");
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, `${process.pid}\n`, "utf-8");

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

CapabilityNode.js network egressnot scored · severity mediumST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

const resp = await fetch(url, init);
const resp = await fetch("http://localhost:11434/api/tags", { signal: controller.signal });

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

CapabilityMCP tool surface detectednot scored · severity lowST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

"mcpServers": {
const server = new McpServer({
server.tool("codebase_index", "Start indexing a codebase in the background. Returns immediately. Call codebase_status to poll progress until 100%. Do NOT search until indexing is complete. If already indexing, returns current progress.", {
server.tool("codebase_update", "Incrementally update an existing codebase index. Only re-indexes changed files. Runs synchronously. Use it to refresh a manual/off snapshot, working-tree edits before the next Git transition in git mode, or w …
server.tool("codebase_remove", "Remove a project's codebase index entirely from the vector database. Safely stops the file watcher, cancels any in-progress indexing/update (with drain), and waits for any in-flight graph build before deletin …
server.tool("codebase_prune", "Inventory stored project identities and their resources. Report-only by default. Applying requires an exact identity, the confirmation token from a fresh inventory, and an acknowledgement that no other host is …
server.tool("codebase_stop", "Gracefully stop an in-progress indexing operation. The current batch will finish and checkpoint, preserving all progress. Re-run codebase_index to resume from where it left off.", {
server.tool("codebase_watch", "Start/stop watching a project directory for file changes and automatically update the index. When starting, first runs an incremental update to catch up, then watches for changes. SOCRATICODE_WATCHER=manual al …
server.tool("codebase_search", "Semantic search across an indexed codebase. Only use after codebase_index is complete (check codebase_status first). Returns relevant code chunks matching a natural language query.", {
server.tool("codebase_status", "Check index status: chunk count, indexing progress (%), last completed operation, file watcher state. Call after codebase_index to poll until 100% complete.", {
server.tool("codebase_graph_build", "Build a dependency graph of the codebase using static analysis (ast-grep). Maps import/require/export relationships between files. Runs in the background — call codebase_graph_status to poll progress unt …
server.tool("codebase_graph_query", "Query the code dependency graph for a specific file. Returns what the file imports and what files depend on it.", {
server.tool("codebase_graph_stats", "Get statistics about the code dependency graph: total files, edges, most connected files, orphan files, circular dependencies.", {
server.tool("codebase_graph_circular", "Find circular dependencies in the codebase.", {
server.tool("codebase_graph_visualize", [
server.tool("codebase_graph_remove", "Remove a project's persisted code graph. Waits for any in-flight graph build to finish first. The graph can be rebuilt with codebase_graph_build or will be rebuilt automatically on the next codebase_ind …
server.tool("codebase_graph_status", "Check the status of the code dependency graph: build progress (if building), node/edge count, when it was last built, whether it's cached in memory. Use this to poll progress after calling codebase_grap …
server.tool("codebase_impact", "Impact Analysis — return the BLAST RADIUS for a file or symbol. Lists every file (and, where helpful, function) that could break if you change the target. Polymorphic on target: a path-like string ('src/foo.t …
server.tool("codebase_flow", "Trace the EXECUTION FLOW forward from an entry point — what does this code call into? With NO args, returns a ranked list of auto-detected entry points (orphans with outgoing calls, conventional names like main …
server.tool("codebase_symbol", "360° view of a symbol: definition, kind, callers, callees, confidence levels. Use to understand a function or class before changing it.", {
server.tool("codebase_symbols", "List symbols in a file, or search by name across the project. Use to discover what exists before drilling into a single symbol with codebase_symbol.", {
server.tool("codebase_context", "List all context artifacts defined in .socraticodecontextartifacts.json — database schemas, API specs, infra configs, architecture docs, etc. Shows each artifact's name, description, path, and index status. …

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in socraticode.

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