SkillTotal

Is socraticode safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • MCP server launches a host command
  • Node.js filesystem read

socraticode is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 6 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

socraticode 1.16.0

npm_package · npm:socraticode
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Sep 28, 2026 · socraticode@1.16.0 · engine 0.53.0 / ruleset 60

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of socraticode's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (6)

HIGHMCP server launches a host commandST-MCP-SERVER-EXEC

An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.

"command": "npx",

Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.

Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
const { stdout } = await exec("git", args, {
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
execSync(`taskkill /F /PID ${pid}`, { stdio: "ignore" });

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

const raw = fs.readFileSync(configPath, "utf-8");
const src = await fs.readFile(path.join(resolvedPath, relPath), "utf-8");
source = await fs.readFile(absolutePath, "utf-8");
const raw = await fs.readFile(configPath, "utf-8");
raw = await fs.readFile(resolved, "utf-8");
return await fs.readFile(path.resolve(root, relativePath), "utf-8");
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "cytoscape.min.js"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "dagre.min.js"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "cytoscape-dagre.js"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "viewer-styles.css"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "viewer-app.js"), "utf-8"),
fs.readFile(path.join(ASSETS_DIR, "viewer-template.html"), "utf-8"),
const content = fs.readFileSync(rootGitignore, "utf-8");
const content = fs.readFileSync(socraticodeignorePath, "utf-8");
const content = fs.readFileSync(gitignorePath, "utf-8");
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8").trim();

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem write/deleteST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

await fs.writeFile(file, html, "utf-8");
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, `${process.pid}\n`, "utf-8");
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, `${process.pid}\n`, "utf-8");

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

* `init` is forwarded to fetch(), allowing callers to attach headers (e.g. an
const resp = await fetch(url, init);
const resp = await fetch("http://localhost:11434/api/tags", { signal: controller.signal });
*     hands to Node's built-in fetch. Node 26's built-in fetch (undici 8)

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

"mcpServers": {
const server = new McpServer({
server.tool("codebase_index", "Start indexing a codebase in the background. Returns immediately. Call codebase_status to poll progress until 100%. Do NOT search until indexing is complete. If already indexing, returns current progress.", {
server.tool("codebase_update", "Incrementally update an existing codebase index. Only re-indexes changed files. Runs synchronously. Use it to refresh a manual/off snapshot, working-tree edits before the next Git transition in git mode, or w …
server.tool("codebase_remove", "Remove a project's codebase index entirely from the vector database. Safely stops the file watcher, cancels any in-progress indexing/update (with drain), and waits for any in-flight graph build before deletin …
server.tool("codebase_prune", "Inventory stored project identities and their resources. Report-only by default. Applying requires an exact identity, the confirmation token from a fresh inventory, and an acknowledgement that no other host is …
server.tool("codebase_stop", "Gracefully stop an in-progress indexing operation. The current batch will finish and checkpoint, preserving all progress. Re-run codebase_index to resume from where it left off.", {
server.tool("codebase_watch", "Start/stop watching a project directory for file changes and automatically update the index. When starting, first runs an incremental update to catch up, then watches for changes. SOCRATICODE_WATCHER=manual al …
server.tool("codebase_search", "Semantic search across an indexed codebase. Only use after codebase_index is complete (check codebase_status first). Returns relevant code chunks matching a natural language query.", {
server.tool("codebase_status", "Check index status: chunk count, indexing progress (%), last completed operation, file watcher state. Call after codebase_index to poll until 100% complete.", {
server.tool("codebase_graph_build", "Build a dependency graph of the codebase using static analysis (ast-grep). Maps import/require/export relationships between files. Runs in the background — call codebase_graph_status to poll progress unt …
server.tool("codebase_graph_query", "Query the code dependency graph for a specific file. Returns what the file imports and what files depend on it.", {
server.tool("codebase_graph_stats", "Get statistics about the code dependency graph: total files, edges, most connected files, orphan files, circular dependencies.", {
server.tool("codebase_graph_circular", "Find circular dependencies in the codebase.", {
server.tool("codebase_graph_visualize", [
server.tool("codebase_graph_remove", "Remove a project's persisted code graph. Waits for any in-flight graph build to finish first. The graph can be rebuilt with codebase_graph_build or will be rebuilt automatically on the next codebase_ind …
server.tool("codebase_graph_status", "Check the status of the code dependency graph: build progress (if building), node/edge count, when it was last built, whether it's cached in memory. Use this to poll progress after calling codebase_grap …
server.tool("codebase_impact", "Impact Analysis — return the BLAST RADIUS for a file or symbol. Lists every file (and, where helpful, function) that could break if you change the target. Polymorphic on target: a path-like string ('src/foo.t …
server.tool("codebase_flow", "Trace the EXECUTION FLOW forward from an entry point — what does this code call into? With NO args, returns a ranked list of auto-detected entry points (orphans with outgoing calls, conventional names like main …
server.tool("codebase_symbol", "360° view of a symbol: definition, kind, callers, callees, confidence levels. Use to understand a function or class before changing it.", {
server.tool("codebase_symbols", "List symbols in a file, or search by name across the project. Use to discover what exists before drilling into a single symbol with codebase_symbol.", {
server.tool("codebase_context", "List all context artifacts defined in .socraticodecontextartifacts.json — database schemas, API specs, infra configs, architecture docs, etc. Shows each artifact's name, description, path, and index status. …

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →