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SkillTotal

Is @supercode-sh/claude-install-mac safe?

Partially analyzed - 5 code files not read (5 minified)
Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):
  • MCP server launches a host command
  • MCP tool surface detected

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

@supercode-sh/claude-install-mac is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: mcp tools detected — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

@supercode-sh/claude-install-mac 0.1.11

npm package · npm:@supercode-sh/claude-install-mac
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Nov 1, 2026 · @supercode-sh/claude-install-mac@0.1.11 · engine 0.89.0 / ruleset 88

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of @supercode-sh/claude-install-mac's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
mcp tools detected

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access

Findings (2)

CapabilityMCP server launches a host commandnot scored · severity highST-MCP-SERVER-EXEC

An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.

Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.

Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.

CapabilityMCP tool surface detectednot scored · severity lowST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in @supercode-sh/claude-install-mac.

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