Is @tangle-network/tcloud safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js dynamic code execution
- Node.js filesystem read
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
@tangle-network/tcloud is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
@tangle-network/
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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of @tangle-network/tcloud's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (5)
The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).
async eval(opts) {async eval(opts) {eval(opts: {Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.
Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
let child_process = require("child_process");import { spawn } from "child_process";spawn(cmd, [url], {let node_child_process = require("node:child_process");import { spawn } from "node:child_process";const child = spawn(cargoBinary, args, {Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component reads files from disk.
...fs.existsSync(CONFIG_FILE) ? JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(CONFIG_FILE, "utf-8")) : {if (fs.existsSync(WALLETS_FILE)) return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(WALLETS_FILE, "utf-8"));
const blob = new Blob([new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(file))]);
...fs.existsSync(CONFIG_FILE) ? JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(CONFIG_FILE, "utf-8")) : {if (fs.existsSync(WALLETS_FILE)) return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(WALLETS_FILE, "utf-8"));
const blob = new Blob([new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(file))]);
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.writeFileSync(CONFIG_FILE, JSON.stringify(c, null, 2), { mode: 384 });fs.writeFileSync(WALLETS_FILE, JSON.stringify(w, null, 2), { mode: 384 });fs.writeFileSync(opts.output, Buffer.from(audio));
fs.writeFileSync(CONFIG_FILE, JSON.stringify(c, null, 2), { mode: 384 });fs.writeFileSync(WALLETS_FILE, JSON.stringify(w, null, 2), { mode: 384 });fs.writeFileSync(opts.output, Buffer.from(audio));
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const initRes = await fetch(`${config.apiUrl}/api/auth/device`, { method: "POST" });const t = await (await fetch(`${config.apiUrl}/api/auth/device/token`, {const res = await fetch(`${c.apiUrl}/api/auth/userinfo`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${c.apiKey}` } });const res = await fetch(`${c.apiUrl}/api/auth/userinfo`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${c.apiKey}` } });const data = await (await fetch(`${config.apiUrl}/api/keys`, {const data = await (await fetch(`${config.apiUrl}/api/keys`, { headers: config.apiKey ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${config.apiKey}` } : {} })).json();const initRes = await fetch(`${config.apiUrl}/api/auth/device`, { method: "POST" });const t = await (await fetch(`${config.apiUrl}/api/auth/device/token`, {const res = await fetch(`${c.apiUrl}/api/auth/userinfo`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${c.apiKey}` } });const res = await fetch(`${c.apiUrl}/api/auth/userinfo`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${c.apiKey}` } });const data = await (await fetch(`${config.apiUrl}/api/keys`, {const data = await (await fetch(`${config.apiUrl}/api/keys`, { headers: config.apiKey ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${config.apiKey}` } : {} })).json();if (!privacy || privacy.mode === "direct") return fetch(url, init);
return fetch(`${privacy.relayerUrl}${proxyPath}`, {if (!privacy || privacy.mode === "direct") return fetch(url, init);
return fetch(`${privacy.relayerUrl}${proxyPath}`, {const response = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {const response = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {const res = await fetch(`${relayerUrl.replace(/\/$/, "")}/relay/fund-credits`, {const res = await fetch(`${relayerUrl.replace(/\/$/, "")}/relay/fund-credits`, {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in @tangle-network/tcloud.
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