Is fastmcp safe?
- Python shell/command execution
- Python network egress
- Python filesystem read
fastmcp is an AI python_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 7 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: delegated authentication, filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).
fastmcp 3.4.7
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of fastmcp's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (7)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
process = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
*cmd,
env=env,
start_new_session=sys.platform != "win32",
)subprocess.run([cmd, "--version"], check=True, capture_output=True)
process = subprocess.run(
[npx_cmd, inspector_cmd, *uv_cmd],
check=True,
env=env,
)process = subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, env=env)
process = subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, env=env)
result = subprocess.run(
[claude_in_path, "--version"],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)result = subprocess.run(
[str(path), "--version"],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)subprocess.run(cmd_parts, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
subprocess.run(
[gemini_in_path, "--version"],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
)subprocess.run(
[str(path), "--version"],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
)subprocess.run(cmd_parts, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
subprocess.run(["open", url], check=True, capture_output=True)
subprocess.run(["xdg-open", url], check=True, capture_output=True)
process = subprocess.run(cmd, check=True)
process = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
*cmd,
stdin=None,
stdout=None,
stderr=None,
# Own process group so _terminate_process can kill the whole tree …subprocess.run(
[
"uv",
"init",
"--project",
str(output_dir),
"--name",
"fastmcp-env",
] …subprocess.run(
[
"uv",
"python",
"pin",
self.python,
"--project",
str(outpu …subprocess.run(
[
"uv",
"add",
*dependencies,
"--no-sync",
"--project",
str(output_dir), …subprocess.run(
[
"uv",
"add",
"-r",
str(req_path),
"--no-sync",
"--project" …subprocess.run(
[
"uv",
"add",
"--editable",
*editable_paths,
"--no-sync",
" …subprocess.run(
["uv", "sync", "--project", str(output_dir)],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)r = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c", code],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=30,
)Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.
A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.
examples=["127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "localhost"],
Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.
The component reads files from disk.
app_bridge_js = app_bridge_cache.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(Path(server_spec)) as f:
data = json.loads(path.read_text())
text = path.read_text()
text = path.read_text()
text = path.read_text()
content = config_file.read_text().strip()
with open(config_path) as f:
with open(config_path) as f:
content := file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
content: str | bytes = await self._async_path.read_bytes()
content = await self._async_path.read_text(encoding=self.encoding)
with open(path, "rb") as f:
return main_file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
return full_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
return full_path.read_bytes()
return full_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
return full_path.read_bytes()
content = main_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(config_path) as f:
with open(self.path, "rb") as f:
with open(self.path, "rb") as f:
with open(self.path, "rb") as f:
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
app_bridge_cache.write_text(app_bridge_js, encoding="utf-8")
with open(output_path, "w") as f:
output_path.write_text(script)
skill_path.write_text(skill_content)
config_file.write_text('{"mcpServers": {}}')file_path.write_text(self.model_dump_json(indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
with open(output, "w") as f:
file_path.write_text(content.text)
file_path.write_bytes(base64.b64decode(content.blob))
cache_path.write_text(
json.dumps({"latest_version": latest_version, "timestamp": time.time()})
)Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
from urllib.parse import urlparse
parsed_url = urlparse(args.url)
from urllib.parse import urlencode
import httpx
with httpx.Client(timeout=30.0) as client:
with httpx.Client(timeout=30.0) as client:
with httpx.Client(timeout=30.0) as client:
url = "/launch?" + urlencode({"tool": tool, "args": json.dumps(tool_args)})client = httpx.AsyncClient(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(60.0, read=None), trust_env=False
)Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (25 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
# These providers pull in heavy deps (authlib, cryptography, key_value.aio,
f"/.well-known/openid-configuration{issuer_path}",# Always register /.well-known/openid-configuration regardless of path depth.
# /{prefix}/.well-known/openid-configuration arrives here as# /.well-known/openid-configuration.
"/.well-known/openid-configuration",
from authlib.common.security import generate_token
from authlib.integrations.httpx_client import AsyncOAuth2Client
- Forward refresh requests to upstream using authlib
If None, authlib will use its default (typically "client_secret_basic").
access_token, and for OIDC providers may include id_token,
to verify a different token (e.g., the OIDC id_token for providers
# When alternate verification is in use (e.g., id_token
# JWTs for both access_token and id_token, which would cause
authorization_endpoint: AnyHttpUrl | str | None = None # Strict
enforce("authorization_endpoint", True)verify_id_token: If True, verify the OIDC id_token instead of the access_token.
id_token is always a standard JWT verifiable via the provider's JWKS.
If None, authlib will use its default (typically "client_secret_basic").
not self.oidc_config.authorization_endpoint
self.oidc_config.authorization_endpoint
When verify_id_token is enabled, returns the id_token from the
id_token = upstream_token_set.raw_token_data.get("id_token")if id_token is None:
Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
mcp = FastMCP()
Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
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