SkillTotal

Is Flask safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python dynamic code execution
  • Python filesystem read
  • Python network egress

Flask is an AI python_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 4 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).

Flask 3.1.3

python_package · pypi:flask
LOW
10
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Jul 5, 2026 · Flask@3.1.3 · engine 0.32.0 / ruleset 30

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Flask's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
dynamic code executionfilesystem readnetwork egress

Findings (4)

HIGHPython dynamic code executionST-DYN-PY

The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).

eval(compile(f.read(), startup, "exec"), ctx)
exec(compile(config_file.read(), filename, "exec"), d.__dict__)

Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.

Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.

MEDIUMServer bound to all network interfacesST-EXPOSE-BIND

A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.

:param host: the hostname to listen on. Set this to ``'0.0.0.0'`` to

Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.

Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.

MEDIUMPython filesystem readST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

return open(path, mode)  # pyright: ignore
return open(path, mode, encoding=encoding)
return open(path, mode)
return open(path, mode, encoding=encoding)
return open(path, mode)  # pyright: ignore
return open(path, mode, encoding=encoding)
with open(startup) as f:
with open(filename, mode="rb") as config_file:
with open(filename, "r" if text else "rb") as f:
response = super().open(
            request,
            buffered=buffered,
            follow_redirects=follow_redirects,
        )

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython network egressST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

from urllib.parse import quote as _url_quote
_anchor = _url_quote(_anchor, safe="%!#$&'()*+,/:;=?@")
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
url = urlsplit(path)

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →