Is Flask safe?
- Python dynamic code execution
- Python filesystem read
- Python network egress
Flask is an AI python_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 4 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).
Flask 3.1.3
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Flask's authors. Report a false positive.
Findings (4)
The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).
eval(compile(f.read(), startup, "exec"), ctx)
exec(compile(config_file.read(), filename, "exec"), d.__dict__)
Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.
Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.
A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.
:param host: the hostname to listen on. Set this to ``'0.0.0.0'`` to
Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.
The component reads files from disk.
return open(path, mode) # pyright: ignore
return open(path, mode, encoding=encoding)
return open(path, mode)
return open(path, mode, encoding=encoding)
return open(path, mode) # pyright: ignore
return open(path, mode, encoding=encoding)
with open(startup) as f:
with open(filename, mode="rb") as config_file:
with open(filename, "r" if text else "rb") as f:
response = super().open(
request,
buffered=buffered,
follow_redirects=follow_redirects,
)Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component makes outbound network requests.
from urllib.parse import quote as _url_quote
_anchor = _url_quote(_anchor, safe="%!#$&'()*+,/:;=?@")
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
url = urlsplit(path)
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →