SkillTotal

Is smolagents safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python shell/command execution
  • Unsafe deserialization
  • Python dynamic code execution

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

smolagents is a PyPI package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: dynamic code execution, filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 20/100 (low).

smolagents 1.26.0

python_package · pypi:smolagents
LOW
20
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Oct 6, 2026 · smolagents@1.26.0 · engine 0.54.0 / ruleset 61

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of smolagents's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
dynamic code executionfilesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication
Unsafe deserialization
General Protections / Input Validation

Findings (7)

HIGHUnsafe deserializationST-DESERIALIZE-PY

It loads data with a format that can rebuild arbitrary objects (e.g. pickle, or unsafe YAML).

return pickle.loads(base64.b64decode(encoded_value[7:]))
return pickle.loads(base64.b64decode(data[7:]))
return pickle.loads(base64.b64decode(data))

Why it matters: Feeding such a loader untrusted data can execute code hidden inside that data.

Fix: Deserialize untrusted data with a safe format/loader: JSON, or yaml.safe_load / Loader=SafeLoader. Reserve pickle/marshal for data you fully control.

HIGHPython dynamic code executionST-DYN-PY

The code turns strings into live code at runtime (eval / new Function / exec).

exec(tool_code, module.__dict__)

Why it matters: If those strings aren't fixed and trusted, they become a way to run arbitrary code.

Fix: Avoid evaluating dynamically constructed code; if unavoidable, ensure the input is a trusted constant and never derived from external data.

HIGHPython shell/command executionST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

subprocess.run([deno_path, "--version"], capture_output=True, check=True)
self.server_process = subprocess.Popen(
            cmd,
            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            text=True,
        )

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

MEDIUMPython filesystem readST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

agent_dict = json.loads((folder / "agent.json").read_text())
tool_code = (folder / "tools" / f"{tool_name}.py").read_text()
importlib.resources.files("smolagents.prompts").joinpath("toolcalling_agent.yaml").read_text()
importlib.resources.files("smolagents.prompts").joinpath("structured_code_agent.yaml").read_text()
importlib.resources.files("smolagents.prompts").joinpath("code_agent.yaml").read_text()
tool_code = Path(tool_file).read_text()

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython filesystem write/deleteST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

with open(os.path.join(output_dir, "prompts.yaml"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(os.path.join(output_dir, "agent.json"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(os.path.join(output_dir, "requirements.txt"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(os.path.join(output_dir, "app.py"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
shutil.copy(file_path, dest_path)
with open(self.runner_path, "w") as f:
file_path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
with open(os.path.join(folder, "__init__.py"), "w"):

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMPython network egressST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

response = requests.get(self._path)
response = requests.get(base_url, params=params)
response = requests.get(self.endpoint, headers=self.headers, params=params)
response = requests.get(
            "https://lite.duckduckgo.com/lite/",
            params={"q": query},
            headers={"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0"},
        )
response = requests.get(
            "https://www.bing.com/search",
            params={"q": query, "format": "rss"},
        )
response = requests.post(
            "https://api.exa.ai/search",
            headers={
                "x-api-key": api_key,
                "Content-Type": "application/json",
                "x-exa-integration": "smolagents", …
from requests.exceptions import RequestException
response = requests.get(url, timeout=20)
response = requests.get(self.server_url)
response = requests.post(self.server_url, json=payload, timeout=self.timeout)
from requests.exceptions import RequestException
r = requests.post(crate_kernel_endpoint, headers=headers)
if requests.get(f"{self.base_url}/api/kernelspecs?token={token}", timeout=2).status_code == 200:
resp = requests.get(f"https://{host}/api/kernelspecs?token={token}")

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

source_code = get_source(self.forward).replace("@tool", "")
# If tool was created using '@tool' decorator, it has only a forward pass, so it's simpler to just get its code
forward_source_code = forward_source_code.replace("@tool", "").strip()
else:  # If the tool was not created by the @tool decorator, it was made by subclassing Tool
f"Multiple @tool decorators found on function '{func_node.name}'. Only one @tool decorator is allowed."
f"Multiple @tool decorators found on function '{func_node.name}'. Only one @tool decorator is allowed."
f"Function '{func_node.name}' has decorators other than @tool. "

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in smolagents.

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