SkillTotal

Is strands-agents safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python shell/command execution
  • Python network egress
  • Python filesystem read

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

strands-agents is a PyPI package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).

strands-agents 1.57.2

python_package · pypi:strands-agents
LOW
10
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Oct 6, 2026 · strands-agents@1.57.2 · engine 0.54.0 / ruleset 61

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of strands-agents's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication
Network exposure
Interaction & Communication

Findings (6)

HIGHPython shell/command executionST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
            program,
            *args,
            stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
            stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
            start_new_session=_USE_PROCESS_GROUP,
        )

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

MEDIUMServer bound to all network interfacesST-EXPOSE-BIND

A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.

llama-server -m model.gguf --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080
host: The host address to bind the server to. Defaults to "0.0.0.0".

Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.

Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.

MEDIUMPython filesystem readST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

return self._resolve_path(path).read_bytes()
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
config_dict = json.loads(path.read_text())
parsed = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
raw = await self._sandbox.read_text(self._artifact_path(self._METADATA_FILE))
result: dict[str, str] = json.loads(metadata_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
skill = Skill.from_content(await sandbox.read_text(md_path), strict=self._strict)
content = skill_md_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
file_content = await sandbox.read_text(file_path)
file_content = await sandbox.read_text(file_path)
file_text = await sandbox.read_text(file_path)

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython filesystem write/deleteST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

await self._sandbox.write_text(self._artifact_path(self._METADATA_FILE), json.dumps(self._content_types))
metadata_path.write_text(json.dumps(self._content_types), encoding="utf-8")
await sandbox.write_text(file_path, file_text)
await sandbox.write_text(file_path, new_content)
await sandbox.write_text(file_path, new_content)

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMPython network egressST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=self.timeout) as client:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=self.timeout) as httpx_client:
timeout_obj = httpx.Timeout(
                connect=timeout[0] if len(timeout) > 0 else None,
                read=timeout[1] if len(timeout) > 1 else None,
                write=timeout[2] if len(timeout) > 2 else None,
                po …
timeout_obj = httpx.Timeout(timeout or 30.0)
self.client = httpx.AsyncClient(
            base_url=self.base_url,
            timeout=timeout_obj,
        )
return httpx.Response(response.status_code, headers=headers, content=response_body, request=step)
translated_request = httpx.Request(
                str(request.method), str(request.url), headers=request.headers.raw, content=_loaded_content(request)
            )
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "strands-agents-sdk"})  # noqa: S310
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as response:  # noqa: S310
active_client = client if client is not None else httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True)

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

- Python-Based Tools: Simple `@tool` decorator with hot reloading
"Python module names, or @tool annotated functions in files.",
or @tool annotated functions). For tools requiring code-based instantiation with constructor
@tool(name=name, description=description, context="tool_context")
# @tool validation does not enforce ``minItems``, so guard here.
to scan for @hook (and optionally @tool) decorated methods, and shared registry
"""Scan an instance's class hierarchy for @tool decorated methods.
Unlike agent-level Plugin, MultiAgentPlugin does not support @tool decorated methods
with @hook and @tool decorators.
tools: Tools attached to the agent, auto-discovered from @tool decorated methods during __init__
Scans the class for methods decorated with @hook and @tool and stores
"""List of tools the plugin provides, auto-discovered from @tool decorated methods."""
3. Auto-registering discovered @tool decorated methods with the agent
4. Auto-registers all discovered @tool methods with the agent's tool registry
@tool(name="noop", description="This is a fake tool that MUST be completely ignored.")
This module provides the @tool decorator that transforms Python functions into SDK Agent tools with automatic metadata
The @tool decorator performs several functions:
raise ValueError("@tool(context) must be set if passing in ToolContext param")

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in strands-agents.

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