Is Answer Me With Html safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js network egress
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
Answer Me With Html is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
answer-me-with-html 0.4.15
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Answer Me With Html's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (2)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';const r = spawnSync('claude', ['-p', '--model', MODEL, '--output-format', 'json', '--setting-sources', 'project', '--strict-mcp-config', '--', prompt], {import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';const r = spawnSync('claude', ['-p', '--model', MODEL, '--output-format', 'json', '--permission-mode', 'acceptEdits', ...lean, ...cfg.args, '--', cfg.prompt(topic.text) + SUFFIX], {import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';const run = spawnSync(process.execPath, args, { encoding: 'utf8', env: { ...process.env, AM_NO_UPDATE_CHECK: '1', AM_HOME: home } });import { spawn as spawn4 } from "node:child_process";import { spawn, spawnSync as spawnSync2 } from "node:child_process";import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";return spawnSync(process.platform === "win32" ? "where" : "which", [cmd], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0;const p = spawn(cmd, args, { stdio: ["ignore", "ignore", "pipe"] });import { spawn as spawn2 } from "node:child_process";import { spawn as spawn3 } from "node:child_process";import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';spawn(cmd, args, { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }).on('error', () => {}).unref();import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';return spawnSync(process.platform === 'win32' ? 'where' : 'which', [cmd], { stdio: 'ignore' }).status === 0;import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';spawn(process.execPath, [scriptPath, '__update-check'], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', env: { ...process.env, AM_HOME: home } })import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';const chrome = spawn(chromePath, [
const ffmpeg = spawn('ffmpeg', [Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
The component makes outbound network requests.
const res = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}`, { headers: { accept: 'application/vnd.github+json' }, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });const presets = () => (presetsPromise ??= fetch(`${BASE}presets/index.json`).then((r) => {res = await fetch(url, {res = await fetch(url, {res = await fetch(url, {res = await fetch(url, {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Answer Me With Html.
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Scan your own componentHow we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →