SkillTotal

Is Claude Code Aso Skill safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python filesystem read
  • Python filesystem write/delete
  • Python network egress

claude-code-aso-skill is an AI python_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 3 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write and network egress — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

claude-code-aso-skill 1.1.0

python_package · https://github.com/alirezarezvani/claude-code-aso-skill
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Aug 5, 2026 · claude-code-aso-skill@1.1.0 · engine 0.38.1 / ruleset 42

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Claude Code Aso Skill's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writenetwork egress

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (3)

MEDIUMPython filesystem readST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
entry = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
body = self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(module_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython filesystem write/deleteST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
probe.write_text("ok", encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(
                json.dumps(
                    {"fetched_at": time.time(), "url": url, "response": response},
                    default=str,
                ),
                encoding="utf-8",
            )
with open("/tmp/wiki/API-Reference.md", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open("/tmp/wiki/FAQ.md", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
shutil.copytree(target, path, symlinks=False)
shutil.copy2(target, path)

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMPython network egressST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

import urllib.error
import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=timeout) as response:
url = f"{self.BASE_URL}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
url = f"{self.BASE_URL}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=timeout) as response:

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →