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Is Claude Skill Social Post safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing
Notable — review in context (a capability is not a malicious indicator):
  • Python shell/command execution
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Python filesystem read

What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.

Claude Skill Social Post is an agent skill analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

claude-skill-social-post

GitHub repository, read as a directory · https://github.com/Hao0321/claude-skill-social-post
LOW
0
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Nov 13, 2026 · claude-skill-social-post@c22737a · engine 1.1.0 / ruleset 100

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Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Claude Skill Social Post's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface
Tool Usage
Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (6)

CapabilityNode.js shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

CapabilityPython shell/command executionnot scored · severity highST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

completed = subprocess.run(
            [node, "--input-type=module", "-e", NODE_PARSE_PROGRAM, str(parser)],
            cwd=root,
            check=False,
            capture_output=True,
            input=payload,
            timeout=30, …
processes.append(subprocess.Popen(
            [sys.executable, "-c", wrapper, str(gate), str(ready), *cli],
            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True,
            encoding="utf-8", env=clean_env,
        ))
delayed = subprocess.Popen(
        [sys.executable, "-c", wrapper, str(script), str(ready), str(release), *cli],
        stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, encoding="utf-8",
    )
children = [subprocess.Popen(argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
                                         text=True, encoding="utf-8", shell=False) for _ in range(2)]
completed = subprocess.run(
        [sys.executable, str(script), *args, "--root", str(root)],
        capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", check=False, env=clean_env,
    )
completed = subprocess.run(
        [node, str(runner)],
        cwd=root,
        check=False,
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
        timeout=30,
    )
result = subprocess.run(
        ["git", "ls-files", "-z", "--cached", "--others", "--exclude-standard"],
        cwd=ROOT, check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
    )

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

CapabilityPython filesystem readnot scored · severity mediumST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

metadata_value = json.loads(METADATA.read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig"))
text = source.read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig")
summary = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
package = json.loads(PACKAGE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
projection = json.loads(PROJECTION.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
projection = json.loads(PROJECTION.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
projection = json.loads(PROJECTION.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
package = json.loads(PACKAGE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig"))
json.loads(Path(value).read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig"))
digest.update(path.read_bytes())
destination: destination.read_bytes() if destination.exists() else None
parser.feed(fixture_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
for row in reply_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
(root / relative).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
if comment_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"):
json.loads(row) for row in (
                root / "data" / "browser_scan_requests.jsonl"
            ).read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
if comment_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"):
for row in request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
before = request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
if "DRY_RUN valid" not in dry.stdout or request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") != before:
for row in request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

CapabilityPython filesystem write/deletenot scored · severity mediumST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

OUTPUT.write_text(rendered, encoding="utf-8")
temporary.write_text(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
oversized.write_bytes(b"x" * (MAX_RECEIPT_BYTES + 1))
shutil.copyfile(source, temporary)
destination.write_bytes(original)
source.write_text(json.dumps(scanned, ensure_ascii=False), encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False), encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(json.dumps(policy), encoding="utf-8")
release.write_text("committed", encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(
        "".join(json.dumps(row, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n" for row in rows),
        encoding="utf-8",
    )
policy_path.write_text(json.dumps(policy), encoding="utf-8")
policy_path.write_text(json.dumps(policy), encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False), encoding="utf-8")
reply_path.write_text(
        "\n".join(json.dumps(row, ensure_ascii=False) for row in rows) + "\n",
        encoding="utf-8",
    )
(root / "references" / "comment-policy.json").write_text(json.dumps(policy), encoding="utf-8")
(root / "data" / "comment_events.jsonl").write_text("", encoding="utf-8")
(root / "data" / "reply_events.jsonl").write_text("", encoding="utf-8")
(root / "references" / "comment-policy.json").write_text(
        json.dumps(fixture_policy), encoding="utf-8",
    )
source.write_text(
        json.dumps(sample_comment("cli", observed_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00+08:00")),
        encoding="utf-8",
    )
source.write_text(json.dumps(emoji_comment, ensure_ascii=False), encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

CapabilityNode.js network egressnot scored · severity mediumST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

const response = await fetch(path, {

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

CapabilityMCP tool surface detectednot scored · severity lowST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Claude Skill Social Post.

Maintain Claude Skill Social Post?

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