Is Dashi Ppt Skill safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js filesystem read
- Node.js filesystem write/delete
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
Dashi Ppt Skill is a directory analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).
repo
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Dashi Ppt Skill's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (5)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';const server = spawn(process.execPath, [path.join(ROOT, 'scripts/serve-preview-https.mjs'), deckDir, String(port)], {import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';const result = spawnSync(attempt.command, attempt.args(target), { encoding: 'utf8' });const result = spawnSync(attempt.command, attempt.args(target), { encoding: 'utf8' });import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';const child = spawn(process.execPath, [
Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.
if (!normalized || normalized === '0.0.0.0' || normalized === '::') return [];
if (!value || value === '0.0.0.0' || value === '::' || value === '*') return '127.0.0.1';
Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.
The component reads files from disk.
hash.update(createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, file))).digest());const source = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(skillRoot, SOURCE_RECORD), 'utf8'));
const version = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(skillRoot, 'project/package.json'), 'utf8')).version;
const previous = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(recordPath, 'utf8'));
const version = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(skillRoot, 'project/package.json'), 'utf8')).version;
const version = prepared?.version || JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, 'package.json'), 'utf8')).version;
const spec = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(specPath, 'utf8'));
const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8'));
const template = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, RUNTIME_TEMPLATE), 'utf8');
return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packagePath, 'utf8')).version || '';
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(npmDir, 'README.md'), '# npm-dist\n\nInstaller and release preparation sources, copied from the development repository for audit. Run the release scripts in the development repository.\n');
fs.writeFileSync(recordPath, JSON.stringify(record, null, 2) + '\n');
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(staging, 'package.json'), `${JSON.stringify({fs.writeFileSync(path.join(staging, 'README.md'), [
fs.rmSync(tempRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });fs.writeFileSync(target, decoded.buffer);
fs.writeFileSync(tmp, content);
fs.rmSync(probe, { recursive: true, force: true });fs.writeFileSync(stageManifestPath(outDir), `${JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2)}\n`);fs.rmSync(tmp, { force: true });fs.writeFileSync(posterPath, Buffer.from(PLACEHOLDER_POSTER_B64, 'base64'));
fs.rmSync(target, { force: true });fs.writeFileSync(entryPath, entrySource);
try { fs.rmSync(entryPath, { force: true }); } catch {}fs.writeFileSync(registryPath, source);
cleanup: () => { try { fs.rmSync(registryPath, { force: true }); } catch {} },fs.writeFileSync(outFile, html);
if (name !== 'user-media') fs.rmSync(path.join(dir, name), { recursive: true, force: true });fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });if (!fs.existsSync(imageSlotStateFile)) fs.writeFileSync(imageSlotStateFile, '{}\n');fs.writeFileSync(registryPath, source);
cleanup: () => { try { fs.rmSync(registryPath, { force: true }); } catch {} },Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
fetch(`https://registry-direct.npmmirror.com/-/package/${PACKAGE_NAME}/syncs`, { method: 'PUT' })const res = await fetch(`${base}/-/ping`, { signal: controller.signal, redirect: 'follow' });import http from 'node:http';
import http from 'node:http';
import https from 'node:https';
https.get(url, { rejectUnauthorized: false }, response => {http.get(url, response => {// page. Reads via fetch() so viewing works anywhere the HTML and sidecar
loadP = fetch(STATE_FILE)
// the fetch (drop or clear) so neither is clobbered by hydration.
import https from 'node:https';
const request = https.get(url, { timeout: REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS }, response => {Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Dashi Ppt Skill.
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