SkillTotal

Is Easel safe?

Some risk - review before installing
Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):
  • Python shell/command execution
  • Node.js shell/command execution
  • Defense-evasion command idiom

What to do: Read the findings below before installing: each one opens the exact line of code it was found on.

Easel is a PyPI package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 2 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, install time execution, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 30/100 (medium).

easel 0.2.1

python_package · https://github.com/ZJU-REAL/Easel
MEDIUM
30
/ 100 risk score
Snapshot · scanned Oct 8, 2026 · easel@0.2.1 · engine 0.56.4 / ruleset 62

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Easel's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):
filesystem readfilesystem writeinstall time executionnetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Execution authority
Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access
Filesystem reach
Tool Execution Context
Network egress
Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication
Network exposure
Interaction & Communication
Supply-chain provenance risk
General Protections / Supply Chain

Findings (10)

HIGHnpm install-time lifecycle hookST-INSTALL-NPM

package.json runs scripts automatically when the package is installed.

"postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js",

Why it matters: Install scripts are a favorite supply-chain foothold — they execute on every machine that installs the package.

Fix: Inspect the hook command. Install-time scripts are a common supply chain execution vector; ensure they do nothing beyond a documented build step.

HIGHDefense-evasion command idiomST-SHELL-EVASION

A command uses a known defense-evasion idiom: PowerShell execution-policy bypass / encoded command / hidden window, macOS code-signing bypass, or launching a payload from a world-writable temp directory. These are hallmarks of droppers and rarely appear in legitimate code. (2 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).

-WorkingDirectory $Root -RedirectStandardOutput $LogFile -RedirectStandardError $ErrorLogFile -WindowStyle Hidden | Out-Null
& powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File (Join-Path $Root 'scripts\gateway.ps1') start

Fix: Verify why the component bypasses execution policy / code signing or runs from a temp directory; these patterns are characteristic of malware staging.

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

import { spawn, execFileSync, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

HIGHPython shell/command executionST-SHELL-PY

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

result = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(PROJECT_ROOT), env=_proxy_env())
result = subprocess.run(
        [sys.executable, str(script)],
        cwd=str(PROJECT_ROOT),
        env=env,
    )
result = subprocess.run(
            ["node", "--version"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10,
        )
result = subprocess.run(
            openclaw_base_cmd() + ["--version"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10,
        )
result = subprocess.run(command, cwd=PROJECT_ROOT)
result = subprocess.run(
            cmd,
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout,
            env=env,
        )
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
                                cwd=str(PROJECT_ROOT), timeout=timeout + 30,
                                env=_proxy_env())
result = subprocess.run(
            openclaw_base_cmd() + ["--version"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10,
        )
proc = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8",
                              errors="replace", timeout=20)
r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
r = subprocess.run(
        ["ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-show_entries", "format=duration",
         "-of", "default=nw=1:nk=1", path],
        capture_output=True, text=True)
r = subprocess.run(
        ["ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-select_streams", "a:0",
         "-show_entries", "stream=codec_name", "-of", "csv=p=0", path],
        capture_output=True, text=True)
r = _sp.run([sys.executable, __file__, "assemble",
                     "--storyboard", str(_wsb(wd, vid, 3.0)), "-o", str(wd / "x.mp4"),
                     "--pad-mode", "trim"], capture_output=True, text=True)
cp = subprocess.run(["ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-select_streams", "a:0",
                         "-show_entries", "stream=codec_name", "-of", "csv=p=0", str(path)],
                        text=True, capture_output=True)
cp = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(asr_script), "transcribe", "-i", str(rp),
                                 "--model", model, "--format", "json", "-o", str(asr_out)],
                                text=True, capture_output=True)
v = subprocess.run(["biliup", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, env=_direct_env())
return subprocess.call(["biliup", "-u", cookie, "login"], env=_direct_env())
return subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, check=False).returncode
proc = subprocess.run(
            [cli_path, "--version"],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
            timeout=10,
        )
proc = subprocess.run(
            cmd,
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
            timeout=timeout,
            env=os.environ.copy(),
        )
proc = _sp.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300)
r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
out = subprocess.check_output(
            ["ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-show_entries",
             "format=duration:stream=width,height,codec_type",
             "-of", "json", str(p)],
            stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode()

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.

MEDIUMServer bound to all network interfacesST-EXPOSE-BIND

A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.

uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port, log_level="warning")

Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.

Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

const fileData = fs.readFileSync(filePath);

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython filesystem readST-FS-PY-READ

The component reads files from disk.

for line in identity.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
for line in env_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
cfg = json.loads(cfg_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return p.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
raw = (state_dir() / CONFIG_FILENAME).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
data = json.loads(DEVICE_IDENTITY_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
data = json.loads(cfg.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
data = json.loads(manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
cfg = json.loads(config_path().read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
text = filepath.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
text = filepath.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
with build_opener(ProxyHandler({})).open(request, timeout=600) as response:
upstream = build_opener(ProxyHandler({})).open(request, timeout=600)
return json.loads(mj.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
existing = json.loads(mpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
data = json.loads((proj / MANIFEST_NAME).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
lines = open(path, encoding="utf-8")
with build_opener(ProxyHandler({})).open(request, timeout=600) as response:
raw = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
tree = ast.parse(script.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMPython filesystem write/deleteST-FS-PY-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

tmp.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
shutil.move(str(src), str(dst))
(proj / "note.md").write_text("正文", encoding="utf-8")
(proj / "cover.png").write_bytes(b"\x89PNG")
(proj / "card_1.png").write_bytes(b"\x89PNG")
(proj / "card_1.jpg").write_bytes(b"jpg")       # 重复 jpg
(proj / "export_cards.py").write_text("build", encoding="utf-8")
(proj / "frames" / "f001.png").write_bytes(b"\x89PNG")
(proj / "meta.json").write_text(json.dumps(
            {"title": "真标题", "platform": "小红书", "tags": ["A", "B"]}, ensure_ascii=False),
            encoding="utf-8")
bak.write_text("\n".join(raw) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
Path(tmp).write_text(
            "".join(json.dumps(r, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n" for r in clean)
            + ("".join(l + "\n" for l in bad_lines) if bad_lines else ""),
            encoding="utf-8")
p.write_text("\n".join(json.dumps(r, ensure_ascii=False) for r in rows) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
srt_path.write_text("\n".join(lines), encoding="utf-8")
ass_path.write_text(header + "\n".join(events) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
concat_list.write_text("".join(f"file '{c}'\n" for c in clips), encoding="utf-8")
sbf.write_text(json.dumps(sb), encoding="utf-8")
srt.write_text("1\n00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:01,500\n第一句\n\n"
                       "2\n00:00:01,500 --> 00:00:03,000\n第二句\n", encoding="utf-8")
p.write_text(json.dumps({"size": "1080x1920",
                                     "shots": [{"video": str(vid), "duration": d}]}), encoding="utf-8")
sbx.write_text(json.dumps({"size": "1080x1920",
            "shots": [{"image": imgs[0], "duration": 4.0, "caption": "音效测试"}],
            "sfx": [{"file": str(sfx), "at": 2.0, "volume": 0.8}]}), encoding="utf-8")
native_sb.write_text(json.dumps({"size": "320x568", "pad_mode": "trim",
            "shots": [{"video": str(native_src), "duration": 1.0, "audio_mode": "native"}]}),
            encoding="utf-8")
native_mix_sb.write_text(json.dumps({"size": "320x568", "pad_mode": "trim",
            "narration": str(voice),
            "shots": [{"video": str(native_src), "duration": 1.0, "audio_mode": "native"}]}),
            encoding="utf-8")
dub_sb.write_text(json.dumps({"size": "320x568", "pad_mode": "trim",
            "shots": [{"video": str(native_src), "duration": 1.0, "audio_mode": "dub"}]}),
            encoding="utf-8")

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

const res = await fetch(`${baseURL}/images/generations`, {
const res = await fetch(`${baseURL}/chat/completions`, {
analyzeViralCmd.option("--comment-pages <n>", "Comment pages to fetch (max 10)", "3");
const res = await fetch(`${CDP_BASE}/json/version`, {
const res = await fetch(`${CDP_BASE}/json/version`, {
const res = await fetch(`${host}${fullUri}`, {
fetch('/api/upload/limits').then((r) => r.json())
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}${url}`, { cache: 'no-store', ...options });
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/chat/question/answer`, {
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/chat/question/status`, {
? await fetch(`${BASE}/api/chat/stream`, {
: await fetch(`${BASE}/api/chat/jobs/${encodeURIComponent(turnId || '')}/stream?after=${lastEventId}`, {

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

MEDIUMPython network egressST-NET-PY

The component makes outbound network requests.

import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(healthz_url(), timeout=10) as response:
from urllib.request import ProxyHandler, Request, build_opener
request = Request(
                    endpoint,
                    data=json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False).encode(),
                    headers={"api-key": api_key, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
                    method="PO …
with build_opener(ProxyHandler({})).open(request, timeout=600) as response:
request = Request(
            stream_endpoint_for(endpoint),
            data=json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False).encode(),
            headers={"api-key": api_key, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
            method="POST", …
upstream = build_opener(ProxyHandler({})).open(request, timeout=600)
from urllib.request import ProxyHandler, Request, build_opener
request = Request(
                os.environ.get("OPENAI_MAAS_ENDPOINT", DEFAULT_ENDPOINT),
                data=raw_body,
                headers={
                    # Standard OpenAI-compatible authentication, configurable for …
with build_opener(ProxyHandler({})).open(request, timeout=600) as response:
if urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url).hostname in {
request = urllib.request.Request(
        url, data=body,
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}", "Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": UA},
        method="POST",
    )
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
request = urllib.request.Request(
        url, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}", "User-Agent": UA}, method="GET",
    )
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
dl_req = urllib.request.Request(image_url, headers={"User-Agent": UA})
with urllib.request.urlopen(dl_req, timeout=120) as resp:
dl_req = urllib.request.Request(image_url, headers={"User-Agent": UA})
with urllib.request.urlopen(dl_req, timeout=120) as resp:
handlers = [urllib.request.ProxyHandler(proxies)] if proxies else [

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

How attackers abuse these capabilities

Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Easel.

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