Is Golive Skill safe?
- Node.js shell/command execution
- Node.js network egress
- Server bound to all network interfaces
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
Golive Skill is an npm package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 1 risky construct is reported for review. It can: delegated authentication, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 10/100 (low).
golive 0.1.0-alpha.8
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Golive Skill's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (4)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd, stdio: 'inherit', shell: false });const result = await exec(process.execPath, [join(packageRoot, 'skills', PRODUCT, 'scripts', `${PRODUCT}.mjs`), ...(help ? ['help', ...argv.slice(1)] : argv)], { cwd }); return result.code;import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, ['--require', guard, join(bundle, 'scripts', `${PRODUCT}.mjs`), ...args], { cwd: scratch, env: { HOME: scratch, USERPROFILE: scratch, XDG_CONFIG_HOME: scratch, NO_COLOR: '1' }, encoding: 'utf8', ti …import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';const rootResult = await exec('git', ['rev-parse', '--show-toplevel'], { cwd });const listing = await exec('git', ['ls-files', '-co', '--exclude-standard', '-z'], { cwd: root });import { spawn } from "node:child_process";const child = spawn(cmd, args, {import { execFile, execFileSync } from "node:child_process";import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, ['--require', guard, join(bundle, 'scripts', `${PRODUCT}.mjs`), ...args], { cwd: scratch, env: { HOME: scratch, USERPROFILE: scratch, XDG_CONFIG_HOME: scratch, NO_COLOR: '1' }, encoding: 'utf8', ti …import { execFile, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';const child = spawn(cmd, args, {Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.
A server is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), not just your own machine.
return h === "localhost" || h.endsWith(".localhost") || h === "127.0.0.1" || h === "0.0.0.0" || h === "[::1]";return h === 'localhost' || h.endsWith('.localhost') || h === '127.0.0.1' || h === '0.0.0.0' || h === '[::1]';Why it matters: Without authentication, other hosts on the network can reach it.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only use, or require authentication and restrict access if remote exposure is intended.
The component makes outbound network requests.
{ axis: "email", id: "sendgrid", deps: ["@sendgrid/mail"] },{ axis: "email", id: "smtp", deps: ["nodemailer"] },{ axis: 'email', id: 'sendgrid', deps: ['@sendgrid/mail'] },{ axis: 'email', id: 'smtp', deps: ['nodemailer'] },Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect delegated-authentication flow was detected (authorization-code / refresh-token / token-exchange grant, an OIDC authorize/discovery endpoint or id_token, or a delegation library). Tools authenticate with the end user's delegated, scoped credentials rather than a long-lived embedded service credential. (2 occurrence(s) shown as evidence).
{ axis: "auth", id: "authjs", deps: ["next-auth", /^@auth\//] },{ axis: 'auth', id: 'authjs', deps: ['next-auth', /^@auth\//] },Fix: Delegated auth is a lower-blast-radius execution context than an embedded static credential. Confirm the requested scopes are minimal and that tokens are never logged or forwarded off-host.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Golive Skill.
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