Is Last30Days Skill safe?
What Last30Days Skill does
/last30days is an agent skill that researches what people said about a topic recently, across sources such as Reddit, X, YouTube, TikTok, arXiv and Techmeme, and scores results by engagement. It is published in the mvanhorn/last30days-skill repository. It runs Python scripts and shell commands, makes network requests, and its first-run setup installs extra CLIs; optional API keys and browser cookies enable more sources and are kept in ~/.config/last30days/.env or the OS keychain. Before installing, decide which sources you need and add only those keys, since each key extends what the skill can reach.
- Python shell/command execution
- MCP server launches a host command
- Python filesystem read
What to do: The Go code was not checked for shell, network or file access, so this result is incomplete. Review that code before installing.
Last30Days Skill is an agent skill analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. Its Go code was not checked for shell, network or file access, so this result is partial. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
last30days-skill 3.39.0
Get notified when this component changes
Change alerts aren't live yet. Leave your email and we'll let you know when they launch. We use it only for this and delete it on request.
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Last30Days Skill's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (6)
An MCP server entry launches a command on your host.
"command": "${__dirname}/bin/last30days-pp-mcp",Why it matters: Trusting the manifest means running that binary — verify what it is and where it comes from.
Fix: Verify the launched command and its source before trusting this MCP server configuration.
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=ROOT, check=True)
subprocess.Popen(recipe["command"], env=launch_env)
result = subprocess.run(
cmd,
cwd=repo_dir,
env=env,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout_seconds,
check=False,
)subprocess.run(
["git", "worktree", "add", "--detach", str(worktree_dir), rev],
cwd=REPO_ROOT,
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)subprocess.run(
["git", "worktree", "remove", "--force", str(path)],
cwd=REPO_ROOT,
check=False,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)result = subprocess.run(
[binary, "cookies", "--domain", X_COOKIE_DOMAIN, "--json"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)result = subprocess.run(
["security", "find-generic-password", "-w", "-s", service_name],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=10,
)result = subprocess.run(
[
"openssl", "enc", "-aes-128-cbc", "-d",
"-K", hex_key,
"-iv", CHROME_IV_HEX,
"-nopad",
],
input=ciphertext, …completed = subprocess.run(
[pdftotext, str(path), "-"],
capture_output=True,
check=True,
text=True,
timeout=20,
)result = subprocess.run(
[security, "find-generic-password",
"-a", account,
"-s", service,
"-w"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5,
)result = subprocess.run(
[pass_bin, "show", f"{prefix}{key}"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5,
encoding="utf-8", errors="replace",
)out = subprocess.run(
["sysctl", "-n", "hw.model"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=3,
)result = subprocess.run(
["gh", "auth", "token"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5,
)subprocess.run([node, "-e", script, str(src), str(tmp)], check=True,
capture_output=True, timeout=min(60.0, timeout))subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace", timeout=remaining, cwd=workdir,
env=_audit_env(home, fixture))result = subprocess.run(
[binary, "--version"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
timeout=min(timeout, 5),
cwd=workdir, …result = subprocess.run(
_research_argv(binary, prompt, agent_file),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
# X posts are not cp1252. Without this, text=True decodes the CLI's …proc = subprocess.run(
command,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout,
)proc = subprocess.run(
["brew", "install", "yt-dlp"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120,
)proc = subprocess.run(
[npx, "-y", PRINTING_PRESS_NPM, "install", slug, "--cli-only"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=DIGG_INSTALL_TIMEOUT,
)subprocess.run(["pbcopy"], input=user_code.encode(), check=True, timeout=5)
result = subprocess.run(
["taskkill", "/F", "/T", "/PID", str(pid)],
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
timeout=timeout,
ch …proc = subprocess.Popen(
list(cmd),
stdout=stdout_file if stdout_file is not None else subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=stderr_file if stderr_file is not None else subprocess.PIPE,
stdin=subprocess.PIP …result = subprocess.run(
["xurl", "auth", "status"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=10,
)result = subprocess.run(
["xurl", "search", search_query, "-n", str(max_results), "--auth", "app"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout,
)Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.
The component reads files from disk.
text = PYPROJECT.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
text = SKILL_MD.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
text = UV_LOCK.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
rows = json.loads(EVAL_TOPICS_FILE.read_text())
payload = json.loads(cache_file.read_text())
if not engine.exists() or "--json-profile" in engine.read_text(encoding="utf-8"):
payload = json.loads(metrics_path.read_text()) if metrics_path.exists() else {lines = summary_path.read_text().splitlines() if summary_path.exists() else ["# Search Quality Evaluation", ""]
rows = json.loads(path.read_text())
return Path(path).expanduser().read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with open(plan_str, encoding="utf-8") as f:
payload = json.loads(cache_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
content = Path(raw).read_text(encoding="utf-8") if os.path.isfile(raw) else raw
payload = json.loads(cache_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
marker_found = generated_marker in existing_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
generated = html_render.LIBRARY_BRIEF_MARKER in path.read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)with open(plan_str, encoding="utf-8") as f:
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return "microsoft" in Path("/proc/version").read_text().lower()payload = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
raw = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
path.write_text(updated, encoding="utf-8")
SKILL_MD.write_text(text3, encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
UV_LOCK.write_text(updated, encoding="utf-8")
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
cache_file.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2))
(output_dir / "metrics.json").write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2))
(output_dir / "summary.md").write_text("\n".join(lines) + "\n")metrics_path.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2))
summary_path.write_text("\n".join(lines).rstrip() + "\n")_publish_metadata_path(html_path).write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
cache_path.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
pending_path.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
feed_path.write_text(feed_xml, encoding="utf-8")
index_path.write_text(index_html, encoding="utf-8")
feed_path.write_text(
feed.render_atom(
entries,
library_id=library_id,
entry_urls=entry_urls,
author=feed_author,
),
encoding="utf-8", …index_path.write_text(
html_render.render_library_index(entries, entry_urls=entry_urls),
encoding="utf-8",
)path.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
path.write_text(raw, encoding="utf-8")
tmp.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True), encoding="utf-8")
(store / "auth.json").write_text(json.dumps({f"https://auth.x.ai::{client_id}": entry}),
encoding="utf-8")secret.write_text(secret_value, encoding="utf-8")
agent_file.write_text('---\n{"name":"control","description":"control"}\n---\ncontrol\n',
encoding="utf-8")shutil.copyfile(store, os.path.join(child_store_dir, store.name))
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
request = Request(
GEMINI_API_URL.format(model=model, api_key=api_key),
data=json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8"),
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
method="POST",
)with urlopen(request, timeout=120) as response:
import urllib.request
return urllib.error.URLError(_error_from_record(reason) if isinstance(reason, dict) else reason)
error = urllib.error.HTTPError(
record["url"], record["status"], record["http_error"],
headers, io.BytesIO(body or b""),
)req = urllib.request.Request(
payload["url"], headers=payload["headers"], method="GET",
origin_req_host=payload["origin_req_host"],
)import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT) as resp:
import urllib.request
req = urllib.request.Request(
url, headers=headers or {"User-Agent": "last30days-doctor"}
)with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
import urllib.request
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers=headers)
url = f"{SEARCH_URL}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers=headers)
feat_q = urllib.parse.quote(f"repo:{repo} is:issue is:open label:enhancement")fallback_q = urllib.parse.quote(f"repo:{repo} is:issue is:open")bug_q = urllib.parse.quote(f"repo:{repo} is:issue is:open")total_q = urllib.parse.quote(f"author:{username} type:pr created:{from_date}..{to_date}")merged_q = urllib.parse.quote(f"author:{username} type:pr is:merged created:{from_date}..{to_date}")encoded_username = urllib.parse.quote(username, safe="")
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
request = Request(
endpoint,
data=json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8"),
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
method="POST",
)import urllib.request
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.
"command": "${__dirname}/bin/last30days-pp-mcp",Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.
Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Last30Days Skill.
Maintain Last30Days Skill?
The free Claude Code plugin scans each npm, PyPI or MCP package with this report's open-source engine before the install command runs. It runs on your machine and needs no account.
Check your own component
Run the same evidence-backed scan on any MCP server, agent skill, or package.
Scan your own componentHow we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →