Is Linkedin Skills safe?
- Python shell/command execution
- Python filesystem read
- Python network egress
What to do: Nothing here argues against installing it. Grant the capabilities it lists only if you expect the tool to need them.
Linkedin Skills is an agent skill analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).
repo
Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Linkedin Skills's authors. Report a false positive.
Behavioral traits
How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.
Findings (4)
The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.
proc = subprocess.run(
argv,
input=json.dumps(payload),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=120,
)proc = subprocess.run(
argv,
input=json.dumps(payload),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=120,
)out = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "-z"], cwd=ROOT,
capture_output=True, encoding="utf-8", check=True).stdoutresult = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c",
"import lib; [getattr(lib, n) for n in "
"('publish','repost','fetch_post','illustrate','refine','quote_card')]; print('ok')"],
cwd=root, capt …out = subprocess.run(["git", "status", "--porcelain", ".codex-marketplace"],
cwd=root, capture_output=True, **utf8_pipes()).stdoutsubprocess.run([sys.executable, str(sync)], cwd=root, capture_output=True, timeout=120)
result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "unittest", "discover", "-s", "tests", "-q"],
cwd=root, capture_output=True, timeout=900, **utf8_pipes())run = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(path)], cwd=root, capture_output=True, timeout=300,
**utf8_pipes())subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "--quiet", "--depth", "1", f"file://{ROOT}", str(clone)],
check=True, capture_output=True, timeout=600)subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "venv", str(venv)], check=True, capture_output=True, timeout=600)
install = subprocess.run([str(python), "-m", "pip", "install", "--quiet", *requirements],
capture_output=True, timeout=900, **utf8_pipes())return subprocess.run([str(python), str(clone / "scripts" / "selftest.py"), *forwarded],
cwd=clone).returncoderesult = subprocess.run(
["claude", "-p", prompt, "--output-format", "text"],
# The CLI writes UTF-8 whatever the locale. Read as cp1252 (Windows),
# the answer comes back garbled, or fails on a byte cp12 …proc = subprocess.run(
argv,
input=json.dumps(payload),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=120,
)proc = subprocess.run(
argv,
input=json.dumps(payload),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=120,
)out = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "-z"], cwd=ROOT,
capture_output=True, encoding="utf-8", check=True).stdoutresult = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-c",
"import lib; [getattr(lib, n) for n in "
"('publish','repost','fetch_post','illustrate','refine','quote_card')]; print('ok')"],
cwd=root, capt …out = subprocess.run(["git", "status", "--porcelain", ".codex-marketplace"],
cwd=root, capture_output=True, **utf8_pipes()).stdoutsubprocess.run([sys.executable, str(sync)], cwd=root, capture_output=True, timeout=120)
result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "unittest", "discover", "-s", "tests", "-q"],
cwd=root, capture_output=True, timeout=900, **utf8_pipes())run = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(path)], cwd=root, capture_output=True, timeout=300,
**utf8_pipes())subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "--quiet", "--depth", "1", f"file://{ROOT}", str(clone)],
check=True, capture_output=True, timeout=600)subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "venv", str(venv)], check=True, capture_output=True, timeout=600)
install = subprocess.run([str(python), "-m", "pip", "install", "--quiet", *requirements],
capture_output=True, timeout=900, **utf8_pipes())return subprocess.run([str(python), str(clone / "scripts" / "selftest.py"), *forwarded],
cwd=clone).returncodeWhy it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; avoid shell=True.
The component reads files from disk.
for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
with open(path, "rb") as f:
description = json.loads(manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))["description"]
match = FRONTMATTER.match(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
head = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")[:4000]
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
text = Path(args.file).read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
match = re.match(r"\s*(\d+)\b", json.loads(manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8")).get("description", ""))return json.loads((FIXTURES / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
(ROOT / "references" / "hook-formulas.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8"), re.M))
for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
with open(path, "rb") as f:
description = json.loads(manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))["description"]
match = FRONTMATTER.match(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
text = document.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
head = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")[:4000]
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
text = Path(args.file).read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
match = re.match(r"\s*(\d+)\b", json.loads(manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8")).get("description", ""))Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.
Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.
The component writes or deletes files on disk.
shutil.rmtree(temp, ignore_errors=True)
args.save.write_text(json.dumps(transcripts, indent=1, ensure_ascii=False), encoding="utf-8")
shutil.rmtree(temp, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.copytree(src, dest, ignore=ignore)
shutil.copy2(src, dest)
(package_references / name).write_text(blob.stdout, encoding="utf-8")
shutil.rmtree(DEST)
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.
Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.
The component makes outbound network requests.
import requests
self._session = requests.Session()
import requests
self._session = requests.Session()
import requests
self._session = requests.Session()
import urllib.request
request = urllib.request.Request(
SCHEMA_URL.format(actor=actor), headers={"User-Agent": USER_AGENT}
)with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
import requests # noqa: F401
r = requests.get(
"https://api.apify.com/v2/users/me",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
timeout=30,
)r = requests.get(
"https://api.publora.com/api/v1/platform-connections",
headers={"x-publora-key": key},
timeout=30,
)r = requests.get(
"https://api.pixfaro.com/v1/key",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
timeout=30,
)import requests
r = requests.get(url, headers={"User-Agent": USER_AGENT, **headers}, timeout=timeout)import requests
self._session = requests.Session()
import requests
self._session = requests.Session()
import requests
self._session = requests.Session()
import urllib.request
Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.
Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.
How attackers abuse these capabilities
Interactive labs on the attack class behind the rules above. They show the technique, not anything found in Linkedin Skills.
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