Is Storybloq safe?

No malicious indicators - review capabilities before installing

Notable — review in context (capabilities are not malware):

Node.js shell/command execution
Dangerous MCP tool capability
Node.js filesystem read

@storybloq/storybloq is an AI npm_package analyzed by SkillTotal's deterministic static scanner. The scan found no malicious indicators, though 6 risky constructs are reported for review. It can: filesystem read, filesystem write, mcp tools detected, network egress and shell execution — capabilities are what the code can do, not a verdict on intent. Risk score 0/100 (low).

@storybloq/storybloq 1.9.0

npm_package · https://github.com/Storybloq/storybloq

LOW

/ 100 risk score

Snapshot · scanned Aug 10, 2026 · @storybloq/storybloq@1.9.0 · engine 0.38.1 / ruleset 42

Automated static-analysis result. It can contain false positives and false negatives, and is not a claim about the intent of Storybloq's authors. Report a false positive.

Capabilities — what this component can do (not a risk score):

filesystem readfilesystem writemcp tools detectednetwork egressshell execution

Behavioral traits

How this component maps to the CSA agentic threat model. Descriptive — it never affects the risk score.

Tool surface

Tool Usage

Execution authority

Tool Access Control / Direct Tool Access

Filesystem reach

Tool Execution Context

Network egress

Interaction & Communication / Direct Communication

Findings (6)

HIGHDangerous MCP tool capabilityST-MCP-DANGEROUS-TOOL

An MCP tool exposes a powerful capability (files, shell, network, browser, or credentials).

src/mcp/tools.ts:1208-1208

server.registerTool("storybloq_register_subprocess", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:1242-1242

server.registerTool("storybloq_unregister_subprocess", {

Why it matters: Wired into an agent, these grant it real access to your machine — confirm each is required.

Fix: Confirm each powerful tool is required and constrained; broad MCP tools (shell/filesystem/network) grant an agent significant host access.

HIGHNode.js shell/command executionST-SHELL-NODE

The component can run operating-system commands or spawn processes.

src/autonomous/agent-view.ts:1-1

import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process";

src/autonomous/agent-view.ts:38-38

const child = spawn("claude", args, {

src/autonomous/branch-affinity.ts:51-51

while ((match = ENTITY_ID_REGEX.exec(branch)) !== null) {

src/autonomous/candidate-recovery.ts:181-181

const m = TEMP_NAME.exec(name);

src/autonomous/git-inspector.ts:1-1

import { execFile } from "node:child_process";

src/autonomous/lens-harness/context-packager.ts:167-167

while ((match = pattern.exec(content)) !== null) {

src/autonomous/lens-harness/secrets-gate.ts:10-10

import { execFileSync, execSync } from "node:child_process";

src/autonomous/lens-harness/secrets-gate.ts:106-106

const path = execSync(cmd, {

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:1-1

import { spawn, execFileSync, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:726-726

child = spawn(

src/autonomous/resume-marker.ts:81-81

const match = /^Session:\s*(\S+)\s*$/.exec(line);

src/autonomous/stages/codex-native.ts:1-1

import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";

src/autonomous/waker.ts:26-26

import { spawn } from "node:child_process";

src/autonomous/waker.ts:144-144

const child = spawn(cmd, args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env: opts.env, detached: true, stdio: "ignore" });

src/autonomous/waker.ts:468-468

// The record moved between claim and spawn (interactive takeover, re-limit

src/autonomous/waker.ts:1046-1046

const child = spawn(process.execPath, [bin, "waker-run", WAKER_ARGV_SENTINEL], {

src/bus/auto-attach-outcome.ts:67-67

// honoring it and the next hook is allowed to spawn (the fresh child's try-lock reclaims).

src/bus/auto-attach-spawn.ts:7-7

import { spawn as nodeSpawn } from "node:child_process";

src/bus/auto-attach-spawn.ts:8-8

import type { SpawnOptions } from "node:child_process";

src/bus/endpoints.ts:1-1

import { execFile } from "node:child_process";

src/bus/fold.ts:488-488

const match = ENTRY_FILENAME.exec(filename);

src/bus/legacy-v1.ts:1-1

import { execFile } from "node:child_process";

src/bus/legacy-v1.ts:276-276

const match = ENTRY_FILENAME.exec(filename);

src/bus/legacy-v1.ts:525-525

const match = ENDPOINT_FILENAME.exec(entry.name);

src/bus/legacy-v1.ts:582-582

const match = ENTRY_FILENAME.exec(filename);

Why it matters: Powerful and often legitimate — confirm the commands aren't built from untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm the command and its arguments are fully controlled and not derived from untrusted input; prefer execFile with an argument array.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem readST-FS-NODE-READ

The component reads files from disk.

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:119-119

const raw = fs.readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/stat`, "utf-8");

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:995-995

fs.readFileSync(join(telemetryDirPath(sessionDir), "lastMcpCall"), "utf-8").trim() || null

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:1005-1005

const val = fs.readFileSync(join(tDir, "alive"), "utf-8").trim();

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:1092-1092

raw = fs.readFileSync(join(sessionDir, "state.json"), "utf-8");

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:1167-1167

content = fs.readFileSync(alivePath, "utf-8");

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:2310-2310

raw = fs.readFileSync(p, "utf-8").trim();

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:2689-2689

const buf = fs.readFileSync(p);

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:116-116

existing = fs.readFileSync(gitignorePath, "utf-8");

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:286-286

if (fs.readFileSync(entryPath(root, pid), "utf-8") !== payload) return false;

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:339-339

const onDisk = parseEntry(pid, fs.readFileSync(entryPath(root, pid), "utf-8"));

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:461-461

entry = parseEntry(pid, fs.readFileSync(join(dir, name), "utf-8"));

src/autonomous/waker.ts:177-177

raw = fs.readFileSync(statePath, "utf-8");

src/bus/endpoints.ts:151-151

const raw = await import("node:fs/promises").then((fs) => fs.readFile(`/proc/${pid}/stat`, "utf-8"));

src/core/limit-lock.ts:113-113

const raw = fs.readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/stat`, "utf-8");

src/core/owner-liveness-probe.ts:167-167

raw = fs.readFileSync(join(sessionDir, "state.json"), "utf-8");

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming it can't be steered into reading sensitive files.

Fix: Confirm which files are read and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input to reach sensitive locations.

MEDIUMNode.js filesystem write/deleteST-FS-NODE-WRITE

The component writes or deletes files on disk.

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:52-52

"  if(process.ppid!==ppid){try{fs.writeFileSync(alive,\"0\")}catch{}process.exit(0)}",

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:53-53

"  if(fs.existsSync(shut)){try{fs.writeFileSync(alive,\"0\")}catch{}process.exit(0)}",

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:54-54

"  try{fs.writeFileSync(alive,String(Date.now()))}catch{}",

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:392-392

try { fs.unlinkSync(lockPath); return { unlinked: true }; }

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:409-409

fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(body), { mode: 0o600 });

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:478-478

try { fs.unlinkSync(tmpPath); }

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:490-490

try { fs.unlinkSync(handle.tmpPath); }

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:528-528

fs.writeFileSync(tmp, String(pid), { mode: 0o600 });

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:531-531

try { fs.unlinkSync(tmp); } catch { /* ignore */ }

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:537-537

try { fs.unlinkSync(join(tDir, PID_BASENAME)); }

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:716-716

fs.unlinkSync(join(tDir, "shutdown"));

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:954-954

fs.writeFileSync(join(dir, "shutdown"), "1");

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:955-955

fs.writeFileSync(join(dir, "alive"), "0");

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:981-981

fs.writeFileSync(tmp, new Date().toISOString());

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:985-985

fs.unlinkSync(tmp);

src/autonomous/liveness.ts:1789-1789

try { fs.unlinkSync(join(dir, name)); } catch { /* already gone, or not a file */ }

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:127-127

fs.writeFileSync(gitignorePath, content, "utf-8");

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:275-275

fs.writeFileSync(entryPath(root, pid), payload);

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:367-367

fs.unlinkSync(entryPath(root, pid));

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:425-425

fs.writeFileSync(probe, "");

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:426-426

fs.unlinkSync(probe);

src/autonomous/mcp-registry.ts:441-441

try { fs.unlinkSync(join(dir, name)); } catch { /* another process reaped it */ }

src/autonomous/wake-claim.ts:113-113

fs.unlinkSync(tmp);

src/autonomous/wake-claim.ts:168-168

fs.unlinkSync(wakeClaimPath(sessionDir));

src/core/limit-ledger.ts:356-356

fs.writeFileSync(tmp, body, { mode: 0o600 });

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but worth confirming the paths can't be controlled by untrusted input.

Fix: Confirm which files are written/deleted and that paths cannot be influenced by untrusted input.

MEDIUMNode.js network egressST-NET-NODE

The component makes outbound network requests.

src/core/update-check.ts:99-99

* Privacy opt-out for the registry fetch (ISS-777): NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER or CI

src/core/update-check.ts:116-116

const res = await fetch(NPM_REGISTRY_URL, { signal: controller.signal });

src/feedback/github-client.ts:55-55

response = await fetch(url, {

Why it matters: Usually legitimate, but confirm the destinations are expected and no sensitive data leaves.

Fix: Confirm the destination hosts are expected and that no sensitive data is sent off-host.

LOWMCP tool surface detectedST-MCP-DETECTED

An MCP tool surface (manifest or tool definitions) was found.

src/mcp/bus-tools.ts:87-87

server.registerTool("storybloq_bus_send", {

src/mcp/bus-tools.ts:117-117

server.registerTool("storybloq_bus_redeliver", {

src/mcp/bus-tools.ts:132-132

server.registerTool("storybloq_bus_poll", {

src/mcp/bus-tools.ts:146-146

server.registerTool("storybloq_bus_ack", {

src/mcp/bus-tools.ts:157-157

server.registerTool("storybloq_bus_thread_get", {

src/mcp/bus-tools.ts:166-166

server.registerTool("storybloq_bus_thread_update", {

src/mcp/index.ts:99-99

const degradedStatus = server.registerTool("storybloq_status", {

src/mcp/index.ts:129-129

const degradedInit = server.registerTool("storybloq_init", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:369-369

server.registerTool("storybloq_status", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:399-399

server.registerTool("storybloq_phase_list", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:403-403

server.registerTool("storybloq_phase_current", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:407-407

server.registerTool("storybloq_ticket_next", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:417-417

server.registerTool("storybloq_ticket_blocked", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:421-421

server.registerTool("storybloq_handover_list", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:425-425

server.registerTool("storybloq_handover_latest", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:434-434

server.registerTool("storybloq_blocker_list", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:440-440

server.registerTool("storybloq_validate", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:463-463

server.registerTool("storybloq_phase_tickets", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:481-481

server.registerTool("storybloq_ticket_list", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:510-510

server.registerTool("storybloq_ticket_get", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:522-522

server.registerTool("storybloq_ticket_meta_get", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:530-530

server.registerTool("storybloq_issue_list", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:562-562

server.registerTool("storybloq_issue_get", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:574-574

server.registerTool("storybloq_issue_meta_get", {

src/mcp/tools.ts:582-582

server.registerTool("storybloq_handover_get", {

Why it matters: Just context — review which tools it offers and their permissions.

Fix: Review the declared MCP tools and their permissions.

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How we determine this: deterministic static analysis (regex + AST), evidence-anchored, no code execution. Methodology →